On the morning of April 29, at the flight test site of the Kazan Aviation Production Association (KAPO) named after Gorbunov, a ceremony was held to transfer the Tu-160 aircraft named after Vitaly Kopylov to the 121st Guards Aviation Sevastopol Red Banner Heavy Bomber Regiment (Engels). At 14:00, the missile carrier took off from Kazan to the air base in Engels, where it landed at 15:40. Immediately after landing, a solemn meeting of the rocket carrier took place. The event was attended by representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Air Force, the military-industrial complex, and the administration of the Saratov region.
History of the creation of the Tu-160
Heavy combat aircraft were first created in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century and went from the first four-engine airships "Ilya Muromets" to the modern heavy supersonic intercontinental missile carrier-bomber Tu-160.
After the end of the Second World War, in which the USSR and the USA were allies, Europe was redistributed into spheres of influence. In the 50s, two main military-political blocs were formed - NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which were in a state of constant confrontation for decades. The Cold War, which began in the late 40s, could at any moment develop into a “hot” third world war. The arms race, spurred on by politicians and the military, gave a strong impetus to the development of new technologies, especially in rocketry and aviation, but had a detrimental effect on the economic development of the USSR, which did not want to concede to the West in anything. Decisions in the field of weapons development made by Soviet politicians and military personnel were often not supported by economic opportunities. At the same time, Soviet design thought was in no way behind the Western one, often ahead of it and held back mainly by the decisions of politicians. In the late 50s and early 60s, the Soviet Union took the lead in the development of strategic missile weapons, while the Americans relied on strategic aviation. Military parity between the two countries and two military-political blocs was maintained almost until the collapse of the USSR.
In the field of development of strategic aviation, the Soviet design bureaus of A.N. Tupolev, V.M. Myasishchev, R.L. Bartini and P.O. Sukhoi developed numerous projects, which were often ahead of their time, but were never implemented “in metal." Projects of strike Soviet strategic aviation systems known and published in the open press in recent years, such as, for example, Tupolev's "125" and "135", remained "on paper". In the Soviet Union, which became fascinated by the creation of strategic missile systems during the time of N.S. Khrushchev, strike aviation was “not held in high esteem.” Only a few heavy prototype aircraft were built, and even those were not fully tested (sometimes because they were too advanced).
In the early 60s, for example, all work on the M-50 and M-52 strategic aviation systems was stopped. developed at the Design Bureau of V.M. Myasishchev (while the design bureau itself was closed altogether), and in the 70s - on the T-4 (“100”) aircraft, created by the Design Bureau of P.O. Sukhoi and which very successfully began the test cycle. Thus, by the mid-70s, the USSR had a powerful nuclear missile attack system, while at the same time, the small strategic aviation had at its disposal only old subsonic Tu-95 and M-4 bombers, which were unable to overcome the strong and modern air defense system of a potential enemy. The Americans, in turn, constantly developed and improved their aviation component of a nuclear strike.
In the Soviet Union, the military only in 1967, i.e. a few years after the “Khrushchev” lull, they remembered strategic aviation. The impetus was the US decision to develop the AMSA project (Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft, i.e., an advanced manned strategic aircraft) - the future B-1. A new competition was announced in the USSR for an intercontinental multi-mode strike aircraft, as a result of which the now world-famous Tu-160 missile-carrying bomber was created. which in the West received the nickname Blackjack. This article will describe the stages of creating Russia's most advanced air strike system, as well as the many intrigues that preceded this work.
On November 28, 1967, the USSR Council of Ministers issued Resolution ¦1098-378, which announced the start of work on a new multi-mode strategic intercontinental aircraft (CMC). The developers were required to design and build a carrier aircraft with exceptionally high flight performance. For example, the cruising speed at an altitude of 18,000 m was set at 3,200-3,500 km/h, the flight range in this mode was determined within 11,000-13,000 km, the flight range in high-altitude flight at subsonic speed and near the ground was 16,000-18,000 km and 11,000-km, respectively. 13000 km. Strike weapons were supposed to be replaceable and included air-launched missiles (4 x X-45, 24 x X-2000, etc.), as well as free-falling and adjustable bombs of various types and purposes. The total mass of the combat load reached 45 tons.
Two aviation design bureaus began designing the aircraft: the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau (Moscow Machine-Building Plant "Kulon") and the newly restored V.M. Myasishchev Design Bureau (EMZ - Experimental Machine-Building Plant, located in Zhukovsky). The A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau (Moscow Machine-Building Plant "Experience") was loaded with other topics and, most likely, for this reason, was not involved in the work on the new strategic bomber at this stage. By the beginning of the 70s, both teams, based on the requirements of the received assignment and the preliminary tactical and technical requirements of the Air Force, prepared their projects. Both design bureaus proposed four-engine aircraft with variable-sweep wings, but with completely different designs.
After the announcement of the competition, the Design Bureau, led by General Designer Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi, began developing a strategic dual-mode bomber under the symbol T-4MS (or product “200”) - At the same time, special attention was paid to maximum continuity of its design with the design of the previously developed strategic aircraft T-4 (products "100"). In particular, it was planned to preserve the power plant, on-board systems and equipment, use already mastered materials, standard design and technological solutions, as well as proven technological processes.
During the work on the preliminary design of the T-4MS aircraft, the Sukhoi Design Bureau examined several options for aerodynamic configurations. At first, we analyzed the possibility of creating a strategic bomber by simply scaling up the previously developed T-4M aircraft (product "100I") with a variable-sweep wing, but an attempt to implement one option in the layout of another did not give the desired results, since it led to a sharp increase in the dimensions and weight of the aircraft , without ensuring the placement of the required weapons. The designers were forced to look for new principles for constructing the layout diagram of a strategic missile-carrying bomber, which would satisfy the following basic provisions:
* obtaining the maximum possible internal volumes with a minimum washed surface;
* ensuring the placement of the necessary weapons in the cargo compartments;
* obtaining the maximum possible structural rigidity in order to ensure flights at high speeds near the ground;
* exclusion of the propulsion system from the power circuit of the aircraft in order to ensure the possibility of modifying the aircraft according to the type of engines used;
* the prospects of the layout from the point of view of the possibility of continuous improvement of the flight-tactical and technical characteristics of the aircraft.
Working on the latest options for integrated layouts of the T-4M aircraft, the developers came to the conclusion that the option that satisfies the listed conditions corresponds to an aerodynamic layout with an integrated circuit of the “flying wing” type, but at the same time, part of the wing of a relatively small area must have a sweep that can be changed in flight ( i.e. rotary consoles).
This arrangement (under the number "2B") was developed in August 1970 by designer L.I. Bondarenko, approved by the head of the general design department of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau O.S. Samoilovich, the Chief Designer of the aircraft N.S. Chernyakov and the General Designer OKB P.O. Sukhim and served as the basis for further development of the preliminary design.
Blowing models of the selected layout in TsAGI wind tunnels showed the possibility of obtaining high values of the lift-to-drag coefficient at both subsonic and supersonic flight speeds.
An incredibly high calculated value of the lift-to-drag ratio (17.5) was obtained at a speed corresponding to Mach number = 0.8, and at a speed corresponding to Mach number = 3.0, the coefficient was equal to 7.3. With the new “integral” layout, the problem of elastic deformation of the wing was also solved. The small area of the rotating consoles in combination with the rigid supporting body of the center section provided the ability to fly at high speeds near the ground.
Throughout 1971, work was carried out at the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau to finalize the preliminary design of the “two hundred” to the stage allowing it to be submitted for competition. In the same year, purge models were made, and in the TsAGI wind tunnels, various options for the center section, rotary wing consoles, vertical and horizontal tails were studied on models. When purging various configurations of the T-4MS, however, it was discovered that the aircraft was “not centered” and had a five percent instability. The chief designer of the theme, N.S. Chernyakov, decided to finalize the layout. As a result, variants of the “200” arose with a long nose and additional horizontal tail. One of them, scheme ¦8, had an unusual, needle-shaped nose. As a result, a layout with an elongated nose and a slightly protruding canopy was adopted (everything else corresponded to the original layout of the aircraft). Work on the T-4MS topic was completed in September 1971.
As mentioned above, another enterprise that began designing the CMC was the Design Bureau of General Designer Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev (EMZ), which was restored in the mid-60s, which at the end of 1968, by the Order of the MAP, in accordance with the tactical and technical requirements of the Air Force, was tasked with developing a preliminary design strategic multi-mode multi-purpose missile-carrying aircraft with the possibility of its use in three different versions.
The EMZ team began work on the so-called “20” theme (or the M-20 multi-mode missile-carrying bomber). The main strike and reconnaissance version of the aircraft was intended for launching nuclear missile and bomb attacks on remote strategic targets, as well as for conducting strategic reconnaissance. The second option was to combat transoceanic air traffic (i.e. search and destroy transport aircraft and early warning aircraft). The third option was a long-range anti-submarine aircraft designed to search and destroy cruising submarines at distances of up to 5000-5500 km. The total maximum flight range of the aircraft at subsonic speed was supposed to be 16,000-18,000 km.
Having completed the preliminary part of the work, V.M. Myasishchev continued to consider the main goal of his revived Design Bureau to be the promising task of creating a high-speed heavy aircraft. Having research on the topic “20” behind him, the General Designer achieved the inclusion of the EMZ in the competition to create a supersonic multi-mode strategic carrier aircraft. The corresponding MAP Orders were issued on September 15, 1969 (¦285), September 17 and October 9, 1970 (¦134 and ¦321, respectively). New work has begun on the topic "18" (or the M-18 aircraft).
The EMZ team, with great enthusiasm coming from its leader, took on the next task. On February 15, 1971, V.M. Myasishchev made a report to representatives of various research institutes and design bureaus on the research carried out by the EMZ team together with TsAGI, as well as various research institutes of the Ministries of Defense, Radio Industry and Defense Industry. Myasishchev noted in his report the main features of the technical specifications for the new aircraft, namely:
* increase in combat load at normal flight weight by 1.8 times;
* the need to install special equipment to overcome the air defense of a potential enemy;
* an increase in the mass of the combat load and, as a result, the flight weight of the aircraft;
* increase in thrust-to-weight ratio by at least 1.5-1.7 times due to the requirement for takeoff from 1st class unpaved airfields;
* increasing cruising speed to 3000-3200 km/h.
All this, from the point of view of Myasishchev and EMZ specialists, led to a decrease in flight range by 28-30%. The General Designer also informed those present that a huge amount of theoretical and practical research had been carried out on the topic of multi-mode CMC on EMC, including:
* parametric studies of the characteristics of various configurations of the M-20 aircraft using a computer (up to 1200 hours), dynamics and controllability in various flight modes (many experiments and studies were carried out jointly with TsAGI);
* study of optimization of geometric and weight characteristics of various CMC schemes at various flight masses (from 150 to 300 tons) and aircraft sizes;
* study of heat transfer coefficients and heat transfer on models
* aircraft in the T-33 TsAGI tube;
* study of strength and stiffness characteristics and optimization of the main design modes for various schemes and various materials, including studies in SibNIA and TsAGI pipes (T-203);
* research and selection of schemes for the main systems (controls, equipment, chassis, weapons, power plants, etc.);
* design work on the main components of the aircraft structure (wing, fuselage, landing gear, power plants).
In addition, a number of different CMC layouts were simultaneously studied at the EMR in topics 18 and 20. "Myasishchevtsy" began work with an analysis of aircraft layouts made according to the normal aerodynamic configuration, after which they analyzed possible options for CMC layouts according to the "canard" configuration. In particular, the following CMC aerodynamic schemes were studied:
* normal with a variable-sweep wing and two-fin or single-fin tail;
* normal with variable sweep wing and T-shaped tail;
* "duck" design with a triangular wing and tail;
* canard design with variable sweep wing;
* canard design with a complex-shaped wing and downward deflecting consoles;
* tailless design with a delta wing.
As a result, the developers also came to the conclusion that the multi-mode CMC should have a variable-sweep wing. The differences between the various variants of the CMC M-18 and M-20 were that for the main variants of the M-20 the designers used a canard design, and for the M-18 they used a traditional aerodynamic design.
Options for multi-mode CMC were developed under the direct leadership of General Designer V.M. Myasishchev with the participation of many leading specialists of the recreated OKB: deputy chief designer G.I. Arkhangelsky, acting. Deputy Chief Designer M.V. Gusarov, acting Deputy Chief Designer V.A. Fedotov, Head of the Aerodynamics Department A.D. Tokhunts and many others. K.P. Lyutikov was appointed lead designer for CMC. Tokhunts was responsible for the general views, layout, aerodynamics and power plant, Fedotov supervised all work on strength, the introduction of new materials, as well as specific design developments (from individual components to the creation of frames for the designed aircraft), N.M. Glovatsky provided the production part of the projects , simultaneously performing the functions of the chief engineer of a powerful production facility created next to the Design Bureau.
The layouts were calculated for aircraft with a take-off weight of about 150 tons and the ability to refuel in flight, as well as for aircraft with a take-off weight of about 300-325 tons that are not equipped with a refueling system. The type of engines depended on the take-off weight. With an aircraft take-off weight of 150 tons, the thrust of each engine should have been 12,000 kgf, with a weight of 300-325 tons - approximately 22,000-25,000 kgf. It was planned to use promising engines from the N.D. Kuznetsov Design Bureau. The bomber's crew consisted of three to four people. The wing area, depending on the take-off weight, ranged from 670 to 970 m2. The main weapons used were two large air-to-surface missiles. Defensive weapons were not provided.
The M-18 project, in its layout solutions, largely corresponded to the layout scheme of the American Rockwell B-1 bomber and therefore was promoted as more promising (or maybe safer from the point of view of novelty?) for further development. The most important and critical design element of a multi-mode CMC with variable wing sweep was being developed at a faster pace - the original hinge for rotating the console (its model underwent strength and dynamic tests at TsAGI). Nine stands and two flying laboratories were used. As a result of the work carried out, the take-off weight of the Myasishchevsky aircraft was reduced by 10%.
It should be noted that in the multi-mode CMC projects being developed by the P.O. Sukhoi and V.M. Myasishchev Design Bureau, as already mentioned, it was assumed that the aircraft would be used in the main version as a strategic bomber-missile carrier with the possibility of subsequent modification into a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft or anti-submarine aircraft.
After the Air Force formulated new tactical and technical requirements for a promising multi-mode CMC in 1969, it was decided to develop the latter on a broader competitive basis, setting deadlines for the submission of preliminary designs by OKB competitors. This time, in addition to the design bureaus of P.O. Sukhoi and V.M. Myasishchev, the Design Bureau of A.N. Tupolev (MMZ "Experience") was also involved in the work.
Indeed, the specialists of MMZ "Experience" in the process of research, testing and serial production of Tu-144 aircraft acquired invaluable experience (as this corresponded to the open name of the company!) in solving the main problems of supersonic flight, including experience in designing structures with a long service life in conditions long supersonic flight. Effective thermal protection of the aircraft airframe structure, its systems and equipment under conditions of long-term kinetic heating, a set of structural heat-resistant materials with high physical and mechanical characteristics were developed, and the technology for their production at serial plants was introduced. Also, powerful turbofans and turbojet engines with takeoff thrusts up to 20,000 kgf, with specific characteristics acceptable for long-range aircraft, were developed and tested, multi-mode air intakes, etc. were designed and tested. Here it is also necessary to add the experience in developing and fine-tuning complex weapons systems and flight and navigation equipment, gained by the Tupolev team when creating Tu-22M series aircraft and aircraft-missile systems based on them.
At MMZ "Experience" the start of work on CMC. which at the preliminary stage of work was designated differently - both as the "K" aircraft, and as the "60" product, and as the "160" (or Tu-160) aircraft - can be attributed to the second half of 1969, when the design bureau , within the framework of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1098-378 of November 28, 1967 and the tactical and technical requirements for the aircraft developed by the Air Force, began to consider possible options for solving the problem. Work on the new topic was concentrated in department "K" under the general leadership of A.A. Tupolev. Under the direct leadership of V.I. Bliznyuk, who previously participated in the development of the project for the strategic supersonic intercontinental system "108", and A.A. Pukhov, several options for possible layouts of the future aircraft were worked out in the brigades of the "K" department. One of the very first to propose a project for an aircraft with a variable sweep wing, however, the analysis of this option at that stage gave a negative result: the wing rotation unit led not only to a significant increase in the weight of the aircraft structure, but also to its complication, which generally made it difficult to obtain the specified flight-tactical characteristics of the aircraft.
Indeed, the totality of the requirements specified in the 1967 decree posed a very complex and difficult task for the developers. At the first stage of work on CMC, the Tupolev team decided to take supersonic and cruising speeds (at the latter, the maximum flight range was achieved) as the main characteristics that determine the appearance of the aircraft. It should be noted that simultaneously with the beginning of the design of a new strategic bomber, department “K” explored possible ways of developing a supersonic passenger aircraft, which subsequently laid the foundation for work on the new SPS-2 (or Tu-244), so the designers tried to use some of the existing developments when choosing aerodynamic configuration of the aircraft "160". Therefore, along with the CMC version with variable wing sweep, at the first stage the Tupolev team also considered a variant of the “tailless” layout scheme, which was used for the SPS-1 (Tu-144) and SPS-2 (Tu-244) projects. The developments of the OKB on the SPS-2 (Tu-244) project made it possible theoretically to obtain aerodynamic quality in the cruising supersonic mode within 7-9 units, and in subsonic flight mode - up to 15 units, which, in combination with economical engines, made it possible to achieve a given range flight (according to the materials of the Tu-244 project, dated 1973, the flight range of an aircraft with turbojet engines, which had a specific fuel consumption of 1.23 kg/kgsch in supersonic cruising mode, reached 8000 km in supersonic mode). The “tailless” aircraft design, combined with a power plant of appropriate power and efficiency, guaranteed high-speed and range characteristics. The main problems associated with this design were the use of new structural materials and technologies capable of providing long-term flight at high temperatures. In order to reduce the degree of technical risk for the new project, the Tupolev team, unlike their competitors, decided to limit the cruising flight speed of the new CMC to the number M = 2.2-2.3.
One of the main requirements for the CMC was to ensure a long flight range, while the aircraft had to overcome the enemy's air defense zone at high altitude at supersonic speed (or near the ground at subsonic speed), and perform the main flight to the target at an optimal altitude with subsonic cruising speed. Less important was the requirement to be able to operate the aircraft from runways of limited size. To fulfill all the above conditions on one type of aircraft meant solving a complex technical problem. A compromise between the subsonic and supersonic characteristics of the CMC could only be achieved by using a variable-sweep wing and a combined design of engines - single-circuit at supersonic speeds and dual-circuit at subsonic speeds. When choosing the optimal CMC layout, aerodynamicists conducted comparative studies of models with fixed and variable sweep wings, which showed that when flying at subsonic speeds, the aerodynamic quality of an aircraft with a variable sweep wing is approximately 1.2-1.5 times higher than that of an aircraft with fixed wing, and when flying at supersonic speeds, the aerodynamic quality of a CMC with a variable-sweep wing in the folded position (at maximum sweep) is almost equal to that of an aircraft with a fixed wing. As mentioned above, a significant disadvantage of the CMC with a variable-sweep wing was the increase in flight weight due to the presence of an additional mechanism for rotating the wing consoles. Calculations have shown that when the mass of the hinge unit is more than 4% of the mass of the bomber, all the advantages of an aircraft with a variable-sweep wing are completely lost. When using the same type of engines, the flight range at medium altitudes and subsonic speeds of a CMC with a variable-sweep wing was approximately 30-35% (and at low altitudes, 10%) higher than that of an aircraft with a fixed wing Flight range at supersonic speeds and high altitudes with any of the two layout schemes it turned out to be approximately the same, and at low altitude - about 15% more for the CMC with a variable-sweep wing, and the latter also had better takeoff and landing characteristics.
As noted earlier, an important point in the design of a heavy CMC was the choice of the maximum supersonic flight speed. In the course of theoretical studies, a comparative assessment of the range of an aircraft with a variable-sweep wing, designed for flight with two variants of supersonic cruising speed - at M = 2.2 and M = 3, was carried out. At a speed corresponding to Mach number = 2.2, the flight range increased significantly due to the lower specific fuel consumption of the power plant and the higher aerodynamic quality. In addition, the design of the CMC airframe, designed for speed corresponding to the number M=3. assumed, as already mentioned, the use of a significant (by weight) amount of titanium alloys, which led to an increase in the cost of manufacturing the aircraft and to additional technological problems.
With all these conflicting problems, the project developers came to General Designer A.N. Tupolev, who, quickly assessing the situation and weighing all the pros and cons, proposed developing the CMC according to the proven layout scheme of the Tu-144, refusing to use a variable wing sweep flight. It was on this basis that the designers tried to create their first version of a strategic multi-mode carrier, which in its technical solutions was radically different from the T-4MS projects of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau and the M-18/M-20 of the V.M. Myasishchev Design Bureau.
Thus, the initial project of the Tupolev strategic missile carrier, presented by the Design Bureau in the early 70s for a preliminary design competition, was developed according to the layout scheme of the Tu-144, practically as its further development, taking into account the new purpose. The aircraft design, in comparison with the Tu-144 passenger airliner, was distinguished by greater integration of the central part of the airframe and the introduction of capacious weapons compartments into the fuselage.
In this project, developed in parallel with an alternative version of the aircraft with a variable-sweep wing (work on which was nevertheless continued in order to find ways to optimize the entire structure and its individual components), it was supposed to achieve the required flight-tactical characteristics due to a higher level of weight return . However, the fulfillment of the main requirement of the Air Force - ensuring the intercontinental range of the aircraft, at the specific fuel consumption that engine operators could actually obtain, was not ensured with this scheme.
At the initial stage of design, work at the MMZ "Experience" on the topic "K" (or "160") was carried out practically on an initiative basis and without much publicity - a very limited circle of people in the design bureau itself and in the Ministry of Aviation Industry knew about them. From 1970 to 1972, several versions of the CMC layout diagrams were prepared. By 1972, the development of the preliminary design of the aircraft was completed and presented to the Air Force scientific and technical committee. At the same time, the Air Force accepted for consideration the projects of the T-4MS and M-18 aircraft, submitted to the competition by the Design Bureau of P.O. Sukhoi and V.M. Myasishchev, respectively (all three projects were considered as part of the competition to create a new strategic air-based system, held by the Ministry of Aviation industry of the USSR in 1972).
The projects submitted to the competition turned out to be completely different, as one would expect. The different style and style of work of the “fighter” and “bomber” design bureaus could not but be reflected in the proposed designs. But what united them (especially the projects of the Design Bureau of P.O. Sukhoi and V.M. Myasishchev) was the desire to use the maximum number of justified design and technological innovations. In this regard, it is interesting to cite an excerpt from a book of memoirs published in Russia by Colonel General V.V. Reshetnikov, who at that time held the post of commander of long-range aviation.
“Since everything was clear with Tupolev, the commission paid its first visit to Pavel Osipovich. The project he proposed was striking in its unusual aerodynamic shapes, close to a flying wing, in the volume of which there was room for engines, ammunition, and fuel, but the thick profile of this gigantic carrier was very confusing surface: the powerful edge of the attack rib did not fit well with the ideas of a supersonic aircraft. Overcoming awkwardness, I carefully asked Pavel Osipovich about this, and he, it turns out, was waiting for such a question, introduced me to the developments and showed the materials for blowing the model in the TsAGI supersonic wind tunnel. Doubts gradually were filmed, the car seemed quite real and tempting.The thick-profile wing in the smooth integral curves of the outlines of its edges was, apparently, Pavel Osipovich’s discovery, which he so wanted to implement in the design of a large supersonic ship.
An equally interesting and equally deeply developed project was proposed by Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev. It was a thin-body, elegant “pike” in swift forms, which seemed much lighter than the weight contained in it. Eh, let her fly and fly! Vladimir Mikhailovich, an experienced and brilliant designer of heavy warships, as usual, this time also introduced into aircraft systems, without repeating what had already been achieved, many new, original solutions, and combat capabilities promised to reach the highest level in the world." .
In the fall of 1972, at the scientific and technical council at the Ministry of Aviation Industry, reports were heard on the above projects "160" of the A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau (with a gibbous wing based on the Tu-144), T-4MS ("200") of the P.O Design Bureau Sukhoi and M-18 OKB V.M. Myasishchev.
The "160" aircraft project did not receive support due to its "non-compliance with the specified tactical and technical requirements." Colonel General V.V. Reshetnikov said at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Air Force regarding the project of the A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau that the Air Force is actually being offered a passenger aircraft! The situation was somewhat complicated by the erroneously overestimated aerodynamic quality of the presented aircraft in the project. Reshetnikov himself, in the book already mentioned above, recalled the following about this:
“Sitting down in a small hall and peering at the posters hanging on the stand, I was surprised to recognize on them the familiar features of the Tu-144 supersonic passenger aircraft. Was it really the same one? Its technical and flight characteristics did not reach the specified ones, it suffered from a low level of reliability, was uneconomical and difficult to operate. Big troubles also happened. Civil aviation fenced itself off from it in every possible way......Alexey Andreevich (Tupolev - author's note), holding himself somewhat more constrained than usual, with a pointer in his hand, approached the stand. The essence of his proposals boiled down to the fact that between the spread engine packages that occupied the lower part of the fuselage, bomb bays crashed into which missiles and bombs would be placed. Without delving into further reasoning, it was obvious that, having become a bomber, this failed airliner, under the weight of ammunition and defensive weapons It will become heavier, lose its last reserves of strength, and all flight characteristics will fall down.
After about five minutes, or maybe ten, I stood up and, interrupting the report, said that we did not intend to consider the proposed project further, since the passenger aircraft, designed at one time for the needs of Aeroflot, even in a new look, would not be able to get rid of its inherent characteristics. properties that are completely unnecessary in a combat version, and at the same time will not be able to embody the specified requirements for a strategic bomber.
Alexey Andreevich, apparently, was ready for such a turn of events. Without a word of objection, he turned to the central, largest poster, took it by the scruff of the neck and pulled it down with force. In complete silence, the crack of tearing Whatman paper was heard. Then, turning in my direction, he apologized and said that he would invite us to his place again to consider a new preliminary project.”
Here it is appropriate to give another quote from V.V. Reshetnikov’s book, explaining who was the true initiator of the failed “Tupolev” attempt to “attach,” as the military believed, their “passenger brainchild.”
"...But Alexey Andreevich had nothing to do with this story. The main curator of the construction of a supersonic passenger aircraft, the future Tu-144, which was included in the national economic plan, was the powerful D.F. Ustinov (Minister of Defense - author's note), who accepted this mission as a personal obligation not so much to the country and people, but to “dear Leonid Ilyich” (Brezhnev - author’s note), whose name he literally idolized, sometimes losing the boundaries of decency, and even falling into shamelessness...
But the passenger supersonic aircraft, it seems, did not go well and could, to the horror of its curator, upset Brezhnev’s expectations, after which Dmitry Fedorovich seized on someone’s happy idea of palming off the “unwed Aeroflot bride” to the military. Having found herself rejected in the guise of a bomber, she was offered through the military-industrial complex to Long-Range Aviation as a reconnaissance aircraft or a jammer aircraft, or even both. It was clear to me that these aircraft would not be able to mate with any combat formations of bombers and missile carriers, and I could not imagine them in the form of single “flying Dutchmen” in combat conditions and therefore decisively abandoned them.
The Commander of the Navy Aviation, Alexander Alekseevich Mironenko, with whom we always maintained “family ties,” did the same.
But it was not there! Once D.F. Ustinov persuaded the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov, and he, without consulting anyone, agreed to adopt the Tu-144 into naval aviation as a long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft. Mironenko rebelled, but the commander-in-chief took the bit between his teeth and the issue was resolved. Having learned about this, I was seriously alarmed: since they took Mironenko, they will impose it on me too. I call Alexander Alekseevich, urging him to take decisive steps, but he already gives no rest to his commander-in-chief. Finally, Ustinov finds out about Mironenko’s rebellion and calls him to his place. The conversation was long and tense, but Alexander Alekseevich still managed to prove to the Minister of Defense that his insistence was unjustified. The Tu-144 never appeared anywhere else."
Returning to the results of the competition, it should be noted that the T-4MS ("200") aircraft from the Sukhoi Design Bureau made a very favorable impression on the military and attracted a lot of attention. The aircraft project of the V.M. Myasishchev Design Bureau, although it was noted as well-developed and meeting the requirements of the Air Force, was nevertheless rejected due to the fact that the newly recreated design bureau did not have the necessary scientific, technical and production base for its implementation. The plant in Fili, which was previously part of the former OKB-23, was given to V.N. Chelomey for rocket work, and at the new location in Zhukovsky, except for a flight test base, there was practically nothing. In this regard, the opinion of the “Myasishchevites” themselves is interesting, who in numerous publications in the press and in books devoted to EMZ invariably call their aircraft
M-18 was the official winner of the 1972 competition. Most likely, this was the case: the winner of the competition was not officially named, and the protocols of the competition commission contained relevant comments on the submitted projects and recommendations for further continuation of work, after which the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the corresponding Orders of the Ministry of Aviation Administration followed, entrusting work on a multi-mode strategic missile carrier OKB im. A.N. Tupolev. The materials of the meetings and decisions of the competition commission are still unclassified, which gives rise to representatives of the Sukhoi Design Bureau and the EMP named after. V.M. Myasishchev “interpret” the result of the competition in his own way.
OKB P.O. Sukhoi, which already had the necessary experience in building and testing the heavy aircraft T-4 ("100"), was not able to build a prototype of the "two hundred" (and subsequently - production aircraft) due to the loading of its own workshops with products of another , no less important topic. He needed to “give away” one of the main enterprises that produced heavy bombers - the aviation plant in Kazan, and no one (well, except the Sukhovites themselves) wanted this. In addition, the Sukhoi Design Bureau was already busy with work on the new multifunctional fighter T-10 (Su-27) and modifications of front-line strike aircraft Su-17M and Su-24. The transition of the Sukhovites to “heavy” aviation jeopardized all these programs.
At the end of the meeting, the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal P.S. Kutakhov, spoke: “You know, let’s decide this way. Yes, the project of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau is better, we gave it its due, but it has already been involved in the development of the Su-27 fighter, which we very, very necessary. Therefore, we will make the following decision: we recognize that the winner of the competition is the Sukhoi Design Bureau, we will oblige to transfer all the materials to the Tupolev Design Bureau so that it carries out further work..." It was also proposed to transfer all the documentation on the topic to the "Tupolev team" and the V. Design Bureau. M.Myasishcheva...
However, later, the CMC developers at MMZ "Experience" abandoned the documentation for the T-4MS and M-18 aircraft and began to independently continue to work on shaping the appearance of a new attack "aluminum-titanium" aircraft with variable wing sweep, which, ultimately, led to the creation of the Tu-160 bomber.
True, there are different opinions on this matter...
After all the events that decided the future fate of the Soviet strategic missile-carrying bomber, the MMZ "Experience" design bureau (A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau) began the actual design of the aircraft.
In most variants of combat use, long-term subsonic and low-altitude transonic flight regimes were considered as the main ones by the customer. The real response of the developers to these very polar requirements for the aircraft could be the continuation of work on a variant of the missile carrier with variable sweep wings, which later received the designation Tu-160M. Soon, at the suggestion of the head of TsAGI G.P. Svishchev, a decision was made to continue work on the aircraft in the version with variable wing sweep using the latest technologies. Fixed wing configurations were not considered further.
After summing up the results of the competition and receiving an official assignment in the same 1972, MMZ "Experience", TsAGI, LII, GosNII AS, VIAM, NIAT, MIEA. MKB "Raduga", associations "Trud", "Electroavtomatika" and other organizations and enterprises of the Soviet military-industrial complex. as well as Air Force research institutes, began to implement a broad program to optimize the design and parameters of the future aircraft, its power plant, the selection of structural materials and the development of the necessary technologies, the selection of the optimal structure and interconnection of complexes and systems of on-board equipment and weapons. In total, about 800 enterprises and organizations of various profiles were engaged in work on the topic of product “70” in one form or another.
Scientists and engineers from many aviation industry institutes, primarily TsAGI, LII, GosNII AS, as well as many other industry enterprises, made a great contribution to the creation of the Tu-160. Their leaders (G.P. Svishchev, K.K. Vasilchenko, E.A. Fedosov, R.E. Shalin, I.S. Seleznev, S.P. Kryukov, K.K. Filipov, etc.) were able to formulate and solve the main problems on your topic. The general management of the program and coordination of work on the creation of a new strategic system with the Tu-160 carrier aircraft was carried out by Alexei Andreevich Tupolev, who succeeded his father as the head and General Designer of the MMZ "Experience" (or now the A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau), and The direct development of the aircraft was carried out under the leadership of chief designer V.I. Bliznyuk and his deputies - L.N. Bazenkov and A.L. Pukhov.
Considering the complexity and scale of the tasks, this work in the industry was directly led by the ministers of the aviation industry (sequentially P.V. Dementyev, V.A. Kazakov, and after them - I.S. Silaev). The progress of work on the program was coordinated by Deputy Ministers I.S. Silaev, A.V. Bolbot and V.T. Ivanov. A.V. Bolbot headed the coordination council for the Tu-160, G.B. Stroganov headed the central commission for technological support of serial production, and Yu.A. Zateikin and Yu.A. Bardin coordinated the development of avionics (avionics). Everyday assistance and support was provided by the head of the MAP main department for heavy aircraft, V.T. Ivanov.
The concept and tactical and technical requirements for the aircraft ultimately determined its basic design and aerodynamic configuration, and further design implementation was carried out on the basis of the already existing scientific and technical groundwork and practical experience in designing heavy aircraft. The aircraft's developers claim that the general "ideology" of the future aircraft was formed from three completely different, already implemented "ideologies": the long-range strategic subsonic bomber Tu-95, the supersonic medium-range missile carrier Tu-22M and the supersonic passenger airliner Tu-144. From each of the listed aircraft the most necessary properties were taken, which as a result determined the appearance of the new missile carrier and the entire new strike strategic aviation system as a whole. Thus, the use of a wing sweep variable in flight on a heavy aircraft, first introduced on the Tu-22M, ensured the required multi-mode combat use, and a high aspect ratio wing at minimum sweep angles, as on the Tu-95, gave a high aerodynamic quality at subsonic speeds and, accordingly, a greater flight range in these modes. The integration of the central part of the fuselage and underwing multi-mode air intakes, tested on the Tu-144, became the basis for the creation of a perfect structural power scheme and a highly efficient multi-mode power plant. The equipment and weapons systems were based on many units and entire complexes tested on the Tu-22MZ and Tu-95MS.
Based on its previous developments, MMZ "Experience" carried out a radical redesign of the original systems, their optimization to achieve maximum efficiency when used on a new aircraft, while taking into account all the latest achievements that have appeared since the creation of the previous Tupolev machines. Innovations concerned both materials and technologies, as well as the use of new units and systems.
The program for creating a strategic multi-mode aircraft included further improvement of the heat resistance characteristics of structural materials, development and production of high-quality large-sized blanks and semi-finished products, and the creation of the latest technological equipment for mechanical assembly, molding and welding.
During the development of the Tu-160, a search was carried out for a number of new solutions to optimize the structural-power design of the aircraft, reduce and improve the efficiency of multi-mode turbofan engines chosen for the power plant. The implementation of a high level of weight characteristics, taking into account the installation of wing console rotation units on the aircraft, was achieved by optimizing the structural-power design of the aircraft, introducing new semi-finished products and high-strength structural materials such as V95-T2, AK4-1ch and VT-bch. To select the final layout of the Tu-160 aircraft, three main layout options were worked out in most detail:
* integral - with horizontal placement of two “twin” engines and frontal air intakes with a horizontal wedge for braking the air flow (similar to the Tu-22MZ air intakes), with channels passing through the caisson and center section);
* “vertical” - with a vertical arrangement of engines in “sparks” and underwing air intakes with a vertical wedge for braking the air flow;
* “horizontal” - with placement of “twin” engines in engine nacelles with horizontally located short underwing air intakes.
After a detailed analysis, comparative assessment of options, construction of full-scale and scale mock-ups and models, chief designer A.A. Tupolev accepted for further development the third option, which combined the simplicity of the aircraft’s structural and power design and the possibility of guaranteed provision of volumes to accommodate the required amount of fuel. It was with this scheme, taking into account the use of a variable sweep wing, optimization of the elements of the power plant by using short underwing multi-mode air intakes and engines that were economical in the main subsonic mode, it was possible to obtain the required characteristics for a multi-mode strategic missile carrier in a wide range of flight speeds.
After choosing the layout of the aircraft, the design bureau concentrated on developing specific elements of the aircraft and the complex.
On June 26, 1974, a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, according to which the OKB named after. A.N. Tupolev was entrusted with the development of the strategic multi-purpose bomber-missile carrier Tu-160 with four NK-32 engines. The next “clarifying” Government Resolution No. 1040-348 was issued on December 19, 1975. These Resolutions specified the main tactical and technical characteristics of the aircraft. The practical flight range with a combat load of 9000 kg (i.e. with two X-45 cruise missiles) in a subsonic cruising flight mode should have been 14000-16000 km, the flight range along a combined profile, including a 2000 km section at low altitude ( 50-200 m) or when flying at supersonic speed - 12000-13000 km, the maximum speed at altitude was set at 2300-2500 km/h, and the maximum speed when flying at low altitude was 1000 km/h. According to the instructions, the practical ceiling was to be at least 18,000-20,000 m. The normal combat load weight was 9,000 kg. maximum - 40,000 kg. It was assumed that missile weapons were to be used in the following variants:
* 2 X-45M missiles;
* 24 Kh-15 missiles or 10-12 Kh-15M missiles;
* 10-12 Kh-55 missiles.
The bomber armament was supposed to ensure the use of conventional and nuclear free-fall bombs, adjustable aerial bombs with laser and television guidance systems.
After receiving the assignment and solving the main layout and system issues, the design bureau began the practical development of the preliminary design of the aircraft. Most of the most complex engineering and design problems at the initial stage of designing a missile carrier were solved by teams led by leading specialists from the design bureau: G.A. Cheremukhin (in those years he headed the aerodynamics department), V.I. Korneev, A.L. Pukhov (now chief designer on the topic of SPS and Tu-22MZ), V.I. Rudin, E.I. Shekhterman, I.S. Kalygin (now the chief designer of the Tu-334), V.T. Klimov. E.I. Kholopova, V.V. Babakova,
A.S. Semenov and Z.A. Priorova. Problems of ensuring strength and optimizing the structural-power scheme of the Tu-160 were solved by V.V. Sulemenkov, who was one of the first to understand the complex issues of combining loads at subsonic and supersonic speeds for new generation aircraft, which opened the way to a significant increase in their resources and service life. Under his leadership, the leading strength engineers of the I.B. Ginko Design Bureau. V.P. Shunaev, V.A. Ignatushkin, I.K. Kulikov and the teams led by them provided strength calculations, justification of loads, and also developed strength calculation methods for specialists in all fields. This team, together with employees of a number of departments of TsAGI and SibNIIA, carried out a tremendous amount of work on the program of strength and life tests of a number of full-scale units and a full-size aircraft airframe. These tests were carried out to evaluate and confirm the aircraft's service life. Considering the complexity and unusualness of its power circuit, standard static tests were preceded by a large program of testing samples, components and structural elements, including a structurally similar model of the aircraft in 1/3 of its natural size. Work on designing the model and manufacturing a stand for testing it was carried out under the leadership of D.I. Gapeev.
The general management of the development of the Tu-160 design was carried out by I.F. Nezval (former director and chief designer of such famous aircraft as the TB-7 and Tu-128). The development of the aircraft airframe drawings was carried out by the teams of O.N. Golovin, V.M. Barinov, N.T. Kozlov, A.S. Prytkov, S.I. Petrov, V.G. Rezvov. I.S.Lebedeva, D.I.Gapeeva and Yu.L.Laponova.
The design of the chassis was carried out under the guidance of the talented engineer and manager Ya.A. Livshits, who was the author of the chassis design of one of the most successful and famous “stupidly leftist” Tu-16 aircraft. M.T. Ivanov and V.N. Volkov provided him with active assistance. The original design solutions they developed made it possible to ensure the fulfillment of a number of contradictory conditions (both on the Tu-144 and on the Tu-160).
The development of the control system, mechanization and hydraulic equipment was led by the head of the department A.S. Kochegin. The development of control system diagrams, the “ideology” of automatic and steering control was provided by leading specialists V.M. Razumikhin. V.I. Goniodsky and M.I. Leites with their colleagues. It should be noted that the Tu-160 became the first Soviet serial heavy aircraft to use a fly-by-wire control system (EDCS) and transmit information to the control actuators using not a steering wheel, but an ordinary “fighter” stick. The use of EMDS made it possible to implement “electronic stability” with a flight alignment close to neutral, as a result of which the flight range increased, controllability improved and the load on the crew was reduced in difficult situations.
High-altitude equipment was designed in the department of S.V. Drozdov. Leading specialists L.D. Dubrovin, V.N. Fadeev, A.V. Babochkin, G.A. Sterlin, V.S. Zonshain and V.G. Dudik, who had extensive experience in creating air conditioning systems for Tu-22 aircraft , Tu-22M and Tu-144, created an effective cooling and pressurization system for the equipment, as well as a system for ensuring the normal functioning of the crew. For the Tu-160, it was possible to develop and subsequently implement modern methods for diagnosing equipment and systems both in flight and during ground technical work. A lot of work on the implementation of new registration systems, including combat documentation, was carried out by the team under the leadership of V.A. Sablev.
Using the development experience and test results of the Tu-144 supersonic passenger airliner, many issues regarding the thermal protection of the Tu-160 were resolved. The teams of V.A. Andreev (now the chief designer of aircraft using alternative fuels) and G.T. Kuvshinova performed the necessary calculations for the main working areas of the aircraft airframe, depending on the mode and flight conditions.
The design of the power plant was carried out by the design bureau's engine division team under the leadership of V.M. Buhl. A huge contribution to the development of this most important complex for the aircraft was made by leading specialists of the design bureau V.V. Malyshev, E.R. Gubar, N.N. Furaeva, V.A. Leonov, V.M. Dmitriev (now the chief designer of Tu- 324 and Tu-414). The young design engineer I.S. Shevchuk, now the President and General Designer of JSC Tupolev, worked in the same department.
The engines initially chosen for the power plant were NK-25, the same type as those intended for the Tu-22MZ. In terms of traction characteristics, the engine generally satisfied the developers of the bomber, but the specific fuel consumption had to be reduced, otherwise it would not be possible to obtain an intercontinental range even with the most ideal aerodynamics. At this time, the design bureau of General Designer N.D. Kuznetsov began designing a new three-shaft bypass turbojet engine NK-32, which was created as a development of the NK-144, NK-144A engines. NK-144-22, NK-22 and NK-25. The NK-32 turbofan engine with the same take-off afterburning thrust of 25,000 kgf and non-afterburning thrust of 13,000 kgf should have a specific fuel consumption in subsonic mode of 0.72-0.73 kg/kgf and in supersonic mode - 1.7 kg/kgf, and in its The design was planned to use many main components identical to the NK-25. This made it possible for the “Tupolev minders,” thanks to their extensive accumulated experience, to avoid many of the problems that constantly arose during the design of the propulsion power plant of the supersonic passenger airliner Tu-144. In close cooperation with the design bureau of N.D. Kuznetsov, who personally made a huge creative contribution to the creation of the NK-32 engine, as well as to solving the complex problems of its docking with aircraft systems, the Tu-160 power plant was successfully developed in a relatively short time, which in terms of weight and traction characteristics had no equal in the world.
Unlike the Tu-144, the design process of the engine, engine nacelles, air intakes and the choice of location for them on the Tu-160 aircraft was considered by designers and engine engineers in an interconnected manner, which made it possible to avoid many of the shortcomings inherent in the power plant of the failed SPS. "Myasishchevtsy" in their M-18 project settled on the layout of engines and engine nacelles, close to the layout of the power plant of the American B-1. Despite this, MMZ "Experience" decided to carry out a series of works to find a more optimal option...
Together with TsAGI, a large number of purgings of various power plant layout options were carried out on 14 models. A full-scale model of the air intake was even built with two channels that went around the center section beam from above and below. This solution ensured the achievement of the best aerodynamic parameters and the greatest reduction in visibility, but technological difficulties and doubts about the level of combat survivability did not allow this option to be implemented. As a result of the search, as mentioned earlier, the option of pairwise placement of engines in a horizontal plane under the integral center section in two-dimensional, multi-mode underwing air intakes with a vertical air flow control wedge was chosen (similar air intakes underwent a comprehensive flight test on the Tu-144). One of the main reasons for splitting them on the sides into two separate gondolas was the need to free up space for the cargo compartment, which rightfully took a position near the center of mass.
In the 70s, the issues of increasing the survivability of strike aircraft complexes in the conditions of continuous improvement of the air defense systems of a potential enemy became of significant importance. In connection with the emergence of these problems, a special sector was formed at the State Scientific Research Institute of AS, headed by O.S. Korotin (a laboratory since 1984), which dealt with issues of the effectiveness and appearance of airborne defense systems (ADS). This team carried out work to assess the effectiveness and substantiate the rational composition of the Baikal defense complex for the Tu-160 aircraft being developed.
It should be noted that subsequently, in 1981, the largest pressure chamber (dimensions 40.0 x 18.0 x 9.8 m) was built at the State Research Institute of AS for research and testing of the Tu-160 onboard radio-electronic equipment. The high quality of ground testing of the aircraft's electronic systems further accelerated the transition to flight testing.
At the initial and subsequent stages of the creation of the Tu-160 aircraft, TsAGI (with which the Tupolevites had traditionally close ties) played a huge role, primarily G.S. Byushgens and G.P. Svishchev, who in 1975 for work on this topic were awarded the USSR State Prize.
The result of the great work carried out by the designers of MMZ "Experience" together with other organizations, enterprises and institutes of the country was a report submitted by the management of MMZ to the Ministry of Aviation Administration, the abstracts of which are quoted below with minimal edits.
"1. By the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers dated December 19, 1975, the Ministry of Aviation Industry and other defense Ministries were tasked with creating the strategic multi-mode missile carrier Tu-160. The aircraft must be capable of flying at high supersonic speeds, at high subsonic speeds near the ground and for a long time, up to 20 hours, at high altitudes.
Therefore, we were forced to adopt a wing geometry that could be changed in flight.
2. To solve such a huge problem as the creation of the Tu-160, a large complex of research work was carried out jointly with TsAGI, CIAM, NIAT and research institutes of other ministries, which required fundamentally new approaches and volumes of research. For example, during research in wind tunnels, 70 model variants were blown through (2200 tube hours). The resulting lift-to-drag ratio exceeds that achieved on the B-1, both at subsonic and supersonic speeds.
3. In terms of design and technology, in order to provide the required weight transfer, which is very difficult for an aircraft of such a gigantic size with variable wing geometry, we adopted an integral design of the front part of the wing + fuselage (they are a single unit) - this reduces the washed surfaces , reducing drag, increasing aerodynamic quality and reducing the area of structural surfaces, that is, reducing the weight of the structure.
On the rotating part of the wing, in order to obtain minimum weight and good flutter characteristics at high speeds, we have adopted a new stringerless design and new technology - six ribs without stringers, ultra-pure aluminum sheet dimensions - 20 m, front and rear parts of honeycomb and composite structure , large titanium panels are used, etc.
The center section, which bears very large loads from the turning unit (up to 3000 tons), is made by electron beam welding - splicing with a minimum number of bolts. A new method of creating structures is used: the stressed state of the unit is determined and the material - titanium - is increased under this stress. In order to provide such technology, MAP together with the Institute named after. Patona created automatic welding chambers and chambers for vacuum annealing.
A very big design problem is the design of the cargo hatches. To accommodate 12-24 products, cargo hatches have a volume of <...> cubic meters. m, this is three times more than that of the B-52 or Tu-95MS. And such a volume, such an “apartment” must be open at supersonic speed and be durable for exposure to pulsating and thermal loads. To solve this problem, a rigid honeycomb composite structure has been developed.
The plumage is of a honeycomb-monolithic design. In total, the aircraft will have 500 square meters of honeycomb-composite structures.
4. To ensure the necessary strength characteristics of this fundamentally new design, a large range of strength work has already been carried out and planned. 12,000 samples were manufactured for strength tests, the weight of some of them reaches 150 kg, a dynamically similar model (M 1:12.5) and a strength analogue of the Tu-160 (M 1:3) were manufactured for strength studies, new methods for determining stress were created, The second prototype of the prototype aircraft (glider) is in production for static testing; it is planned to build a glider for endurance testing.
5. Much work has been carried out to reduce the ESR.
6. Personally, V.A. Kazakov (Minister of Aviation Industry - author's note) has done a lot of work to comprehensively link the interaction of all equipment and engines. This was facilitated by an integrated group of scientific and technical support for industry - MO. Significant work has been done on equipment at MAP, MRP.MPSS, MOPiMEP...
For the Tu-160 PSM aircraft (the Resolution of the Council of Ministers - author's note) it was specified to create engines with a take-off thrust of 25 tons, Cg=O.72-0.73 kg/kgsch, with an electronic control system, with very high weight and other technical characteristics. data. The power of four engines is over half a million horsepower. Kuznetsov (that is, N.D. Kuznetsov Design Bureau - author's note) and other organizations have done a lot of work on engines. However, a lot still needs to be done to obtain the required resources, specific fuel consumption and stable engine operation under real uneven flow in flight at the engine inlet...
8. Much attention is paid to debugging structures and equipment at stands. To support the entire work program, 60 stands and 7 flying laboratories are being created...
9. To provide new technology, new machines and equipment are needed. The Ministry of Aviation Industry has developed a number of new machines, the development of new machines is underway at the Ministry of Machine Industry...
10. Today, the progress in the MAP on the creation of the Tu-160 is such that we have the problem in our hands, the machine is being produced according to the TTT (tactical and technical requirements - author's note) and we understand the enormity and scale of the problem..."
Work on the new strategic air strike complex was the highest priority for MAP at that time; meetings with the minister were constantly held on it, and special awards were even allocated. Everyone understood that the success of the strategic complex based on the Tu-160 aircraft depended on the efforts of many enterprises. Looking ahead, it should be noted that in the end all work on the complex, which included the Tu-160 carrier aircraft, the Obzor-K sighting and navigation system, the Kh-55SM cruise missile and the Sprut-SM system, were completed on time .
At all stages of the creation of the Tu-160, active consultations and practical assistance were provided by representatives of the Customer, both the Air Force General Staff and Long-Range Aviation (LA). DA Commander (at the aircraft design stage) V.V. Reshetnikov, division commanders, Air Force technical specialists at all levels with great interest resolved issues that arose at all stages of the creation of the machine. In particular, it was V.V. Reshetnikov who helped defend the “control stick”, which replaced the usual steering wheel on a heavy aircraft. Its use in combination with the characteristics of the fly-by-wire control system made it possible to ensure easy and precise control of the aircraft.
Almost simultaneously with the design of the Tu-160, work was underway to create a powerful laboratory base for advanced testing of various units and systems. A total of 112 stands and installations were built, which made it possible not only to solve numerous problems in improving the design, but also to reduce the time for its development and flight testing. Among them: a stand for the wing rotation unit, a full-scale control stand, an emergency escape stand (on the rocket track), a power supply stand, a complex stand for semi-natural modeling KPM-1600, a set of stands for the fuel system, an air intake stand, a flying laboratory based on the first prototype of the Tu aircraft -142M for testing the NK-32 engine, chassis stand, cargo compartment stand and many others. The organization of work on the stands at the MMZ "Experience" was led by A.V. Meshcheryakov and V.P. Voronkov.
In the process of developing various Tu-160 systems, software and mathematical methods for designing (and subsequently manufacturing) parts were further developed. The introduction of new technological methods into practice was carried out under the leadership of I.L. Mindrul, B.P. Beloglazov, I.P. Sandrykin and A.S. Markov. To a large extent, the perfection and elegance of the forms of the new missile carrier was due to the fact that for the first time in the practice of the Design Bureau, its outer surface was described mathematically. Later, according to the programs, templates and a large number of parts and assemblies of both production equipment and the aircraft itself were made.
What was the new “Tupolev” strategic missile carrier according to the design and layout scheme?
Issues related to the overall aerodynamic configuration of the aircraft were resolved in inextricable connection with design and technological problems.
Despite the refusal to directly develop the Tu-144 design, some of the design and technological solutions used on it found application on the Tu-160. These include elements of an integral aerodynamic layout that combines the fuselage and the inflow part of the wing into a single unit. This arrangement solved three important problems at once - it provided high weight perfection, improved load-bearing properties and, thanks to the large internal volumes, made it possible to accommodate a significant amount of combat load and fuel. As a result, with dimensions close to the Tu-95, the Tu-160 turned out to be 50% heavier.
The “70” product under development inherited the general wing design from the Tu-22M. The rotating parts of the wing, rotation and drive units, in their design and technical solutions, generally repeated the decisions made for the Tu-22M, however, a significant increase in size and loads on them required significant modifications to the design and an increase in drive power. In particular, the design of the main power elements of the three times heavier vehicle differed as follows. The five-spar consoles of the new bomber, assembled from seven monolithic panels (four at the bottom and three at the top), were hung on the hinge units of a powerful center section beam, around which the entire aircraft was “assembled.” The central titanium beam absorbed all the main loads, and the remaining elements of the airframe were grouped around it. To manufacture such a large structural element as a titanium beam, a technological process of electron beam welding in a neutral environment was developed, which to this day is a unique technology.
Developing a variable sweep wing and its rotation units for such a heavy aircraft turned out to be a very difficult task. Its use on a strategic bomber required qualitative changes in production technology. For this purpose, a special State program of new technologies in metallurgy was formed, which was coordinated by the Minister of Aviation Industry P.V. Dementyev.
To simplify the schematic and structural connection of the wing and the central part of the airframe, an original design was developed that allows the formation of a good combination of units and a rationally necessary aerodynamic design for different wing positions. The main element of this solution was the so-called “ridges” - deflectable root parts of the flaps, synchronously tracking the rotation of the consoles from cruising to maximum sweep. “Crests” installed on the engine fairings created smooth transition zones between the units when the wing sweep changed.
When choosing the tail design, options were considered with an all-moving stabilizer located at the top of the keel, and a keel with a normal rudder, as well as a middle location of the stabilizer with the rudder divided into two sections. In the final version, the original design was adopted with a two-section keel, consisting of a lower fixed part, to which an all-moving stabilizer was attached, and an upper movable part. Such a solution made it possible, in conditions of limited volumes, to place powerful electric power steering and articulated drives for the deflectable planes of the tail unit.
As mentioned earlier, together with the State Research Institute of AS and other organizations, the "weapons" of MMZ "Experience" were searching for the most effective missile weapons system. Based on the uncertainty of the geopolitical and military situation in the future, the issue of the weapons system of the Tu-160 aircraft was supposed to be resolved taking into account its multifunctionality. It was planned to arm the aircraft with ultra-long-range, long-range and medium-range missiles, guided and unguided short-range weapons, and also have missile fire defense. Priority was given to weapons that could defeat any targets, including low-contrast targets, without entering the air defense zone of a potential enemy and that could be placed only in the internal compartments of the aircraft. The onboard equipment complex was supposed to provide navigation and the use of a wide range of onboard weapons.
Initially, the main missile armament of the Tu-160 was to use two long-range X-45 missiles (one in each of the two cargo compartments) or 24 short-range X-15 missiles (six on each of the four turrets). These weapon options determined the dimensions of the cargo compartments, with the main role played by the large dimensions of the Kh-45 cruise missile (its length was 10.8 m, its height in the configuration with folded wings was 1.92 m, the launch weight reached 4500 kg. The estimated flight range was 1000 km). The volume of each of the two cargo compartments was approximately the same as the volume of the Tu-95 cargo compartment. In addition to supersonic low-altitude missiles, it was proposed to create subsonic low-altitude cruise missiles with a correlation navigation system along the terrain for aircraft of this class.
In the process of preliminary design of the aircraft, the possibility of using X-45 missiles, as already mentioned, faded into the background; weapons developers and the Customer gave preference (now following the USA!) to new weapons - cruise missiles. "Voruzhentsev" MMZ "Experience" together with colleagues from the Raduga design bureau prepared technical proposals for a cruise missile in normal and strategic versions with conventional and nuclear warheads for hitting low-contrast ground and sea targets (X-55 and X-55SM). At the initial stage, the leadership of the MAP and the Air Force decided to pursue the strategic version of the N9 missile. This situation remained until 1976, when it became clear that the United States was intensively developing a missile for the same purpose (ALCM-B), and work on the X-55SM continued. The missile was longer than the X-15, which required the creation of a new revolver launcher.
The issue of the arrangement of cargo compartments in the fuselage took quite a long time to resolve. At an early stage, an option was considered to locate two cargo compartments side by side in the central part of the fuselage, which would give a minimum dispersion of alignments when dropping combat cargo, but at the same time increase the midsection of the fuselage and add complexity to the design of optimal engine nacelles. Subsequently, the “paired” cargo compartments were abandoned and placed one behind the other.
Returning to the general appearance of the aircraft, it should be noted that the reduction in aerodynamic drag was facilitated by the large elongation of the fuselage and the smooth contours of its nose with strongly beveled windshields. It should be mentioned here that at the initial design stage, the installation of a deflectable nose cone similar to those used on the Tu-144 and T-4 (“100”) aircraft was considered, but then this design was abandoned. The graceful shape of the Tu-160 as a whole was achieved primarily through a rational structural layout. So, for example, to reduce the midsection of the fuselage, the front landing gear compartment was placed behind the cockpit, and not under it (as on the B-1), the main landing gear was shortened when the landing gear was retracted. All these measures made it easier to achieve the specified characteristics and gave the aircraft an elegant shape (how can one not recall the popular saying of the founder of the Design Bureau and Russian “heavy” aviation, Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev, that a beautiful aircraft will fly well!).
The bomber was supposed to be built with extensive use of modern materials: 38% of the structure was made of titanium alloys, 58% of aluminum, 15% of high-quality steel alloys and 3% of composite materials.
In 1976-1977, a preliminary design and a full-size mock-up of the aircraft were prepared, which in 1977 were accepted and approved by the customer with comments. How difficult it was to defend the Tu-160 draft design can be seen from the following memoirs of Colonel General of Aviation V.V. Reshetnikov, who, as already mentioned, commanded Soviet Long-Range Aviation in the 70s (the quote is given without editorial correction).
“In the oval hall of the Tupolev Design Bureau, Alexey Andreevich, all collected and a little solemn, presented the preliminary design of a new bomber, called the Tu-160.
For a minute or two we silently peered at the calculated data from tables and graphs, examined images of technological divisions, mentally combining them into a single image of the ship. In its new, unusual outlines it was strict and stern, although it had some portrait resemblance to the American B-1...
The reports seemed to eliminate any possibility of questions arising, but they rained down like peas on both the general and his assistants. It was felt and seen that everything was at the limit in the calculations. But everything will inevitably creep in big, and everything else will follow. What then? Where will supersonic speed end up? At what points will the range end? But the aerodynamic quality will wobble, won’t the variable wing geometry become a weight burden? Questions piled up, clinging to each other, giving rise to new ones, and answers to them did not come immediately.
I and my “team”, which grew into a mock-up and then into the state commission for the creation of the Tu-160, worked long and often in the design bureau. Almost every morning the weight report was updated: the damned weight, first in units, and then, combining into tens of tons, crawled like the temperature of a doomed patient, and the subcontractors, in any case, most of them, who created the onboard “stuffing” and weapons systems, were not ashamed and without repentance, they brought their signature heavy conglomerate of yesterday into aircraft volumes. And there are no barriers to them, since there are no competitors. Sliding and balancing as if over an abyss, TsAGI saved the initial calculations, calculated and recalculated aerodynamic characteristics, issuing new recommendations, but they collapsed again under the weight of the growing weight.”
According to the preliminary design, the estimated take-off weight of the Tu-160 was 260 tons, the loaded weight of the aircraft was 103 tons, the fuel weight was 148 tons with a normal combat load of 9 tons. The bomber was slightly larger in size than its American counterpart Rockwell B- 1 A. The composition of the weapons was subsequently changed somewhat: as mentioned earlier, the use of Kh-45 missiles was abandoned, leaving only the aviation versions of the Kh-55 on two multi-position ejection units (MKU) of the drum type or the Kh-15 on four MKU, and also options with suspensions of various bombs. In the future, they generally limited themselves to only the option with two MCUs for 12 missiles of the Kh-55SM type.
In the same 1977, the design bureau of N.D. Kuznetsov began the direct development of the NK-32 engine (product “R”) for the aircraft being created. Its flight tests began in 1980 on the Tu-142M flying laboratory (the test engine was located in a streamlined gondola under the carrier’s cargo compartment).
The first flight prototype of the Tu-160 aircraft (products "70-01", "aircraft 01" or, as it was also unofficially called - "nulevka"), like all previous experimental aircraft of the OKB, was put into construction at the MMZ "Experience" in 1977 year with the involvement of all its branches in this work. The work, in particular, was carried out in close cooperation with the serial aircraft plant in Kazan (KAPO), where preparations were simultaneously underway for full-scale production of the bomber. A little later, they began to build a second copy of the aircraft (product "70-02"), which was a full-scale glider for static strength tests, and a third prototype aircraft (product "70-03", "plane 03", also the second flight one). The production of prototype aircraft made it possible to combine the development of assembly technologies for a new bomber and a huge range of work to organize the production of new large-sized parts, semi-finished products and blanks from high-strength titanium and aluminum alloys, to introduce a complex of the latest technological equipment, and also to introduce technology already proven in pilot production at serial plants. The technological processes developed under the leadership of S.A. Vigdorchik, E.M. Rumyantsev and V.V. Sadkov were successfully implemented at serial plants. At the same time, new non-metallic materials were also being mastered, the introduction of which was coordinated by a team led by B.A. Peshekhonov and V.P. Azhazhi.
The aircraft production technology, fully tested at the Opyt MMZ, included the most modern technological processes, such as titanium welding, mechanical processing of large panels and assemblies, gluing three-layer panels, etc.
Welded thin-walled titanium and three-layer aluminum panels were used in the design of the engine nacelles. The air intakes were assembled mainly from riveted panels made of AK4-1ch material.
Much attention was paid to the selection and establishment of production of semi-finished products from aluminum and titanium high-strength alloys, the main part of which were products that had already been tested on the Tu-144 SPS. The main, most “used” heat-resistant materials were aluminum alloy AK4-1ch, titanium alloy OT-4, as well as new high-strength alloys with high fracture toughness mastered by the metallurgical industry V-95pch-T2 and VT-bch. Large-sized forged-rolled plates and extruded profiles, large-sized six-mm sheets for cladding were used as semi-finished products from aluminum alloys; large-sized forgings and stampings. Titanium semi-finished products in the form of plates, pressed panels, stampings and forgings were also widely used.
For the production of aircraft components, a whole complex of technological equipment was developed and manufactured, including lines of large-sized metalworking machines, drawing presses, hardening, welding and heat-treating furnaces and installations, many of which were unique (such as ELU-24 and UVN-4500m) . It was possible to master the production of a welded center section together with wing rotation units.
Monoblock caissons assembled from monolithic panels and profiles 20 m long were widely used in the wing design. The fuselage was assembled from large-sized sheets, profiles and stampings using special riveting. Control units and wing mechanization (stabilizer, fin, flaperons, flaps, etc.) were manufactured with extensive use of composite and metal glued panels with honeycomb core.
A great contribution to the production of the first prototypes of the "70" product at the "Experience" MMZ was made by teams led by V.I. Borodko, A.V. Meshcheryakov, V.P. Nikolaev, G.F. Volkov, M.A. Bormashenko, V.V. Antamokhina, V.P. Fadeeva.
In addition to technical issues, the problems of transporting large aircraft components also had to be resolved. Thus, to continue the strength tests carried out on the airframe of the second aircraft built at MMZ "Experience", the airframe of a production aircraft was transported from Kazan to Moscow along the waterway through the Moscow-Volga Canal (so-called "fatigue" tests were carried out on it). The horizontal tail was delivered on the external sling of the Tu-95 aircraft, and the cargo Il-76TD was widely used to deliver other units and engines.
After completion of the main work by the summer of 1980, the first flight prototype of the Tu-160 ("70-01" or "aircraft 01") was transported from Moscow to Zhukovsky, where at ZhLI and DB (Zhukovsk flight test and development base) MMZ "Experience" "We finished assembling it. On August 18, 1981, a huge unpainted machine was rolled out onto the airfield for airfield testing and ground testing of systems and equipment, which began on October 22. The final assembly of the prototype aircraft was completed in Zhukovsky in January 1981. For almost 10 months (until November 1981), development and testing of various systems continued. All ground work, as well as flight tests, were carried out under the leadership of the head of the ZhLI and DB V.T. Klimov and his deputy V.G. Mikhailov. Test pilots from the OKB (MMZ "Experience") and MAP - B.I. Veremey, S.G. Agapov, V.V. Pavlov, V.N. Matveev and V.A. Dralin - took part in the flight design tests, and also navigators M.M. Kozel and A.V. Eremenko, with methodological and organizational support for a team of leading engineers under the leadership of A.K. Yashukov. According to the testing methodology adopted in ZhLI and DB, each aircraft copy was assigned to a leading pilot and a leading engineer. At various stages, the most complex flight tests were provided by the head of the LIC (flight test complex) M.V. Ulyanov, leading engineers R.A. Engulatov, A.P. Gusev and V.A. Naumov. Coordination of work on preparing aircraft for flights and operational guidance for eliminating defects that arose were provided by leading engineers of the Design Bureau V.V. Babakov, E.L. Kornilov, V.V. Tereshin, E.A. Aleshin and others. A lot of work on testing the NK-32 engines and operational improvements to the power plant was carried out by the leading engineer of the Design Bureau, Yu.S. Gorbatenko.
On November 14, 1981, the car, under the control of a crew led by test pilot B.I. Veremey, made its first taxi at the LII airfield, and within a month it made three runs. On November 25, the day before the second run, the “70-01” product was taken out from under light cover (where it was hidden from American satellites) and installed next to the Tu-144. On the same day, the new plane was spotted by American satellites, and experts, knowing the dimensions of the plane standing nearby, accurately determined the dimensions of the new Soviet bomber.
On December 18, 1981, the first experimental aircraft, piloted by a crew under the command of B.I. Veremey (co-pilot - S.T. Agapov, navigators - M.M. Kozel and A.V. Eremenko) took off for the first time from the airfield in Zhukovsky. The flight took place on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the leader of the Soviet state L.I. Brezhnev. This fact was perceived by everyone as a gift from the OKB to them. A.N. Tupolev and the entire aviation industry to the hero of the day.
From the moment of the first flight of the experimental Tu-160, the stage of flight design (factory) tests began. B.I. Veremey flew especially a lot in the car, for whom the Tu-160, as he later said, became a “native” aircraft (in total, Veremey made more than 600 flights on this type of missile carrier and flew more than 2000 hours; in 1984 he "for the development of new military equipment" he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union). Here's what Boris Ivanovich said about the first flight and subsequent tests:
“Everything was leading to the fact that the missile carrier would take wing on December 19, the birthday of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. The Secretary General, as you know, was seriously involved in the development of the Armed Forces, and initially they decided to give him a gift, to lift a new missile carrier on that day. However, to install a special installation There was no Tu-160 on the wing on December 19, and the launch took place a day earlier. 27 minutes of flight in the area of the airfield on board "00" ("nulevka", as mentioned earlier, was unofficially called the first flight prototype - author's note) I remember so far: takeoff, climb to 2000 m, departure to a distance of 150-220 km into the zone, return and landing - the baptism of the “one hundred and sixtieth” took place.
The flight was carefully analyzed, our comments were checked for convergence on the stand. For the first time in the history of the design bureau, a hydromechanical test bench was used to fine-tune the aircraft and test the performance of its systems, which is used by the world's leading aviation companies. For testing, a special unit was created, led by leading engineer Anatoly Yashukov. We made about 20 flights. On the 13th we changed places with Sergei Agapov, he sat on the left, I sat on the right, so that he could have his own assessment of the control of the aircraft.
The machine behaved predictably; on its first flight it repeated the results obtained in bench tests. At the suggestion of the pilots, changes were immediately introduced to the control system; it was fly-by-wire in design and made it possible to do this... Together with me, the leading test pilots were Sergey Agapov, Vladimir Smirnov, Nail Sattarov.
It's time to show the car to senior management. I remember how Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov arrived at the airfield at the beginning of 1983. He saw the Tu-160, ran around the plane, rejoiced, as he himself said - he immediately looked twenty years younger. The marshal postponed the scheduled meetings at the Design Bureau and spent all the allotted time near the missile carrier. I was very happy that we have such a bomber."
NATO assigned the preliminary designation "RAM-P", and later the aircraft was given a new code name - "Blackjack". Since that time, US space intelligence services have continuously monitored the progress of testing the new Soviet bomber. Its appearance prompted the US government to speed up work on the B-1B aircraft and accelerated its serial production.
Soon the Western press published a photograph of the new Soviet bomber. Some comments stated that the plane was deliberately, for propaganda purposes, exposed to the lenses of American reconnaissance satellites, while it was assumed that the image was taken from space. In fact, as it later turned out, the published photograph was taken by one of the passengers of a civilian plane landing at the nearby Bykovo airfield.
Externally, the Tu-160 bomber seemed very similar to the American B-1, despite the difference in size. But a number of features indicated different concepts adopted in the design of these machines. The B-1, for example, at the insistence of the US Air Force, abandoned adjustable air intakes, which provided a smaller effective surface area for radio beam dispersion. And although the plane was formally considered supersonic and could reach speeds corresponding to the number M = 1.2 at high altitudes. from the point of view of combat use, this flight mode could not be considered optimal. In turn, the multi-mode adjustable air intakes of the Tu-160, combined with powerful engines and a high aspect ratio fuselage with a relatively small midsection, made it possible to reach speeds of up to 2,200 km/h (this speed was subsequently achieved in one of the test flights). The successful layout of the fuselage also contributed to the reduction in aerodynamic drag. The cockpit on the Soviet bomber was located in front of the nose landing gear compartment, and not above it. The maximum height of the Tu-160 fuselage was no greater than that of the medium Tu-22MZ bomber, which had significantly smaller dimensions. The designers managed to reduce aerodynamic drag due to the strong sharpening of the forward part of the fuselage, as well as the large bevel of the cockpit windshield.
Soon, during flight design tests, the first two prototypes were joined by the first copies of the head series, built in Kazan at KAPO im. S.P.Gorbunova. On October 10, 1984, the first production aircraft built in Kazan (¦1-01, which meant the 01st aircraft of the 1st series) made its first flight, and on March 16, 1985, the second production aircraft (¦1-02). The third production Tu-160 (¦2-01) took off on December 25, 1985, and the fourth (¦2-02) took off on August 15, 1986. The production ones differed in appearance from the first prototype in their slightly more refined aerodynamics, especially in the contours of the nose of the fuselage. During the testing process, troubles often occurred. So, in one of the flights the front landing gear did not extend, but B.I. Veremey managed to skillfully land the plane, which received only minor damage and soon returned to service.
The Soviet Tu-160 production program, like the corresponding American program, envisaged the production of about a hundred vehicles, but a decrease in defense allocations in the second half of the 80s, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, led to its complete curtailment. By the beginning of the 90s, KAPO built 34 Tu-160 aircraft, including airframes for endurance and strength tests. The 184th Guards TBAP in Priluki received 19 production vehicles, from which two squadrons were formed. Of the total number of aircraft produced, one, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was lost in a plane crash in the spring of 1987; several aircraft, including the first experimental ones, were used by MMZ "Experience" for work on various bomber improvement programs.
In the second half of the 90s, the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin decided to resume serial production of the Tu-160 with the aim of introducing into service a fully equipped regiment of bombers of this type. On December 23, 1997, the penultimate of two unfinished aircraft standing in the workshop (¦8-02) made its first flight from the KAPO airfield in Kazan. After a short cycle of acceptance tests, it joined the group of strategic bombers based in Engels.
To organize a collective system of electronic countermeasures and interception of strategic bombers of a potential enemy based on the Tu-160 aircraft, a project for the Tu-160PP jammer was developed. It was proposed to use the volume of the weapons compartment to accommodate special electronic equipment and powerful generators. The project was not implemented primarily due to the curtailment of serial production of the main (basic) version of the aircraft.
In addition to the above-mentioned interceptor director, ASTC named after. In the 80s, A.N. Tupolev conducted research on the further development of the Tu-160 complex. Several projects for further development of the aircraft were at the stages of preliminary development. It was planned to switch to more economical NK-74 engines, equip them with high-precision weapons, the latest equipment, etc. There was a Tu-160V project with a power plant running on liquid hydrogen. The Tu-160V differed from the Tu-160, in addition to the power plant, in the dimensions of the fuselage, designed to accommodate tanks with liquid hydrogen.
The reduction in the volume of construction of military equipment in Russia forced the developers of the Tu-160 aircraft to look for a new, civilian application for it. In the early 90s, the Tupolev ASTC, together with the Raduga mechanical engineering design bureau (from the city of Dubna) and the Moscow Energy Institute of Aviation Systems, developed a project for the Burlak aviation complex, which was intended for launching commercial artificial satellites into low-Earth orbits.
The Burlak complex included:
* carrier aircraft Tu-160SK (modified serial Tu-160);
* launch vehicle "Burlak";
* means of ground support, preparation and processing of information.
The three-stage, liquid-fueled Burlak launch vehicle, weighing 20 tons, was planned to be suspended under the fuselage of the aircraft. The maximum mass of payload launched into orbit could reach 800-850 kg, and the cost of delivery was 6-8 thousand US dollars (per 1 kg of mass of the launched cargo). The Tu-160SK, equipped with an in-flight refueling system, ensured the launch of a rocket with a satellite in almost any area of the planet. According to calculations, the flight range with the launch vehicle, which was located not on an external sling under the fuselage, but inside the cargo compartment, without refueling the carrier in the air, was 1000 km. The rocket launch was to be carried out at altitudes from 9000 m to 14000 m at carrier flight speeds of 850-1600 km/h. The Tu-160SK, together with a rocket for loading a foreign satellite, could make an intermediate landing at an air base of any country, while the safety of the technology of the customer country was guaranteed. Only the structural elements of the satellite had to be agreed upon in advance: power supply, overall dimensions, weight, operating temperature range, etc.
Using the Burlak system, it was possible to launch several satellites into orbit simultaneously. According to preliminary calculations, an air launch of a launch vehicle at high altitudes and speeds made it possible to reduce energy costs for launching equivalent loads by 2-3 times compared to a ground launch. The cost of launching using the Burlak complex was calculated to be 2-2.5 times lower than that of rockets with a similar payload capacity with a vertical ground launch.
The ability to select a rocket launch point over the ocean ensured launch into any orbit and eliminated the problem of leasing territories for possible fall zones of spent rocket stages.
In terms of its tactical and technical characteristics, the Burlak complex was significantly superior to the American subsonic launch complex, created on the basis of the Boeing B-52 carrier aircraft and the Pegasus launch vehicle. Thus, the Tu-160 heavy attack aircraft could be used for peaceful purposes.
The idea of using the Tu-160 for satellite launches received an unexpected continuation in 1999 in Ukraine. The American company Platforms International Corporation (PIC) from Mohave, California, announced its readiness to purchase three Ukrainian aircraft and spare parts for them for $20 million, as well as transfer a 20% stake in its division Orbital Network Services Corporation (OrbNet ) Russian Aerospace Consortium. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also issued a corresponding resolution allowing the sale of aircraft. It was assumed that OrbNet would be able to carry out the first satellite launch from a Tu-160 in one to two years. However, this project was not destined to come true.
In service
The first of the combat pilots to lift up the Tu-160 was the Deputy Commander of Long-Range Aviation for Combat Training, Honored Military Pilot of the USSR, Aviation Major General L.V. Kozlov. Aviation Lieutenant General P.S. Deinekin, who commanded the 37th VA at that time, followed the example of his deputy. The leading test pilot of the aircraft, Boris Ivanovich Veremey, says:
“Lev Vasilyevich Kozlov from the headquarters of Long-Range Aviation came to pick me up, we went to the airfield in Zhukovsky to work out a standard program designed for 7-14 flights. I also let Pyotr Stepanovich Deinekin fly. He brilliantly completed seven flights, flew cleanly, beautifully. Air Force Commander-in-Chief Marshal Efimov forbade the commander of Long-Range Aviation from flying for security reasons. Deinekin had to fly illegally when Efimov went on vacation."
In April 1987, the first Tu-160s entered the 184th Guards Poltava-Berlin Red Banner Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, based in Priluki (Chernigov region of Ukraine). After the end of World War II, the regiment became one of the elite units of the Soviet Air Force. He was the first to master the Tu-4 strategic bomber, then he was armed with various modifications of the Tu-16 bomber, and in 1984 the newest Tu-22MZ missile carriers appeared in the regiment. Even before the start of operation of the new strategic aircraft, the airfield in Priluki was reconstructed, and the runway was strengthened and extended to 3000 m.
Combat pilots of the 184th GvTBAP began mastering the Tu-160 without waiting for the completion of state tests, which could have been delayed due to the large amount of work. The decision to begin trial operation of the aircraft (and, in essence, military tests) made it possible to put it into operation, identifying defects and shortcomings in everyday work, transferring experience to other regiments, which were also supposed to be re-equipped with new bombers. Trial operation of such a complex aircraft required high professionalism from the flight and technical personnel. Usually, Long-Range Aviation personnel were retrained at the Long-Range Aviation training center in Dyagilevo (near Ryazan), but this time the crews had to study the machine directly at enterprises in Kazan (where the aircraft were built) and Samara (where the engine was developed). The leading test pilot of MMZ-Experience B.I. Veremey and factory test pilots from Kazan primarily trained instructor pilots of the 37th VA. With the help of the instructors, a program of export flights for combat pilots was carried out.
In April 1987, the first two Tu-160 aircraft landed in Priluki, one of which was piloted by the deputy commander of Long-Range Aviation, Lieutenant General L.V. Kozlov. One of the articles cited an interesting fact that after arrival, “...in addition to the traditional bread and salt, the pilots were awaited by a huge number of “special officers” assigned to guard the new equipment.”
On May 12, Kozlov took off on a new plane from the airfield in Priluki, and on June 1, the combat crew headed by the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Grebennikov, took off. On the same day, the first commander of the “one hundred and sixties” detachment, Major Alexander Medvedev, who in the regiment was called “ace Medvedev” (i.e. A.S. Medvedev), made an independent takeoff on a new missile carrier. In June, the Tu-160 was lifted into the air by majors Nikolai Sguditsky, Valery Shcherbak and Vladimir Lezhaev. The regiment's pilots performed their first flights on the same plane, which they prepared for repeated launches right on the runway, without taxiing to the parking lot.
In mid-summer, the crew of the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. Grebennikov (Major General L.V. Kozlov was also part of the crew as an inspection inspector), made the first successful launch of the Kh-55SM cruise missile. Preliminary crew training was carried out on Tu-134UBL aircraft, specially designed for training bomber pilots (in particular, those flying the Tu-22MZ). Pilots who flew troikas, when switching to the Tu-160, rated the latter’s controls as easier. To speed up the development of the aircraft and save its service life, a gym was equipped in the regiment. In order to more effectively use the two available machines and train a sufficient number of pilots, several crews were “taken out” during the day on the same plane, waiting for their turn at the edge of the runway. It is interesting that in the first months of operational operation the planes did not taxi on their own to take off (to avoid debris from the ground being sucked into the air intakes); they were towed by a tractor, in front of which a line of soldiers cleared the runway.
In general, combat pilots liked the aircraft, which was easy to fly, had good acceleration and climb rates, and flew steadily at low speeds (up to 260 km/h). If errors occurred in piloting, the warning system and automatic restrictions were activated, preventing an emergency from occurring.
The transfer of production vehicles to the combat unit before the completion of the cycle of joint state tests provided not only the opportunity to really evaluate the aircraft, but also to identify problems associated with both the design flaws of the bomber and issues with its operation. In the first months of “combat training,” Tu-160s rarely returned from flights without failures in any systems, especially in the avionics. Accidents were avoided mainly due to multiple duplication and redundancy of systems. Periodic failures of various systems and inadequate equipment prolonged the “military tests” for several years. At the same time, the country's leadership was rushing the developers and military to quickly put the aircraft into service.
From time to time, problems arose with the bomber's power plant, especially when starting the engines, and automatic failures occurred during flight. So, in one of the flights, two engines stopped in the air at once, but a sufficient supply of thrust allowed the crew to continue the flight and land the car safely at the airfield. Once we even had to take off with one engine not working. There were also complaints about the frequent destruction of the nozzle flaps of the NK-32 engines. Another “weak point” of the power plant was the air intakes, the vibration of which caused cracks to form and rivets to fly out. This defect was gradually eliminated by replacing the first sections of the air ducts and strengthening the edging of the leading edges of the air intake.
At high flight speeds, the honeycomb glued panels of the tail surface delaminated. Such cases took place both in Priluki and at FLI, where experimental and several first production aircraft continued to fly. In one case, a piece of the stabilizer came off in the air, in two others, a part of the fork (the detachment of one of the plastic fairings of the fork was noticed both during the demonstration of the Tu-160 in Ryazan, and after the landing of the 70-03 aircraft during one of the air shows in Zhukovsky). The bomber's tail had to be strengthened and at the same time the stabilizer span had to be reduced by half a meter (to reduce loads). Modified stabilizers with a span of 13.26 m were delivered from the plant in Priluki on the fuselage of a specially modified version of the Il-76 aircraft.
The plane also had a “parking” feature: with the wing consoles folded (i.e., with a sweep of 65 degrees), it could tip over onto its tail, so the aircraft were left on the ground with the wing deployed (i.e., in a position with a minimum sweep of 20 degrees. ), although the Tu-160 took up significantly more space at the airfield.
Preconditions for accidents also occurred due to the fault of the crews. For example, due to its great inertia, the plane rolled off the runway onto the ground several times.
Especially many problems at the initial stage of operation of serial aircraft accumulated due to insufficiently developed avionics systems, in particular, the Baikal airborne defense complex, which was mainly located in the rear fuselage (i.e. in the zone of increased vibrations during running engines). The pilots believed that they were “carrying inoperative ballast.” By the beginning of the 90s, the BKO was still able to be finalized, but failures occurred periodically.
The machine, easy to operate and stable in all modes, turned out to be completely unsuitable for long flights. The pilots had great complaints about the design of the K-36LM seat. In certain positions, the pilot could not leave the plane in the event of an accident. In the first months of operation of the bombers, the developers of the seats tried to persuade the pilots not to move it, but under pressure from the military they nevertheless began to modify it. According to the pilots, the K-36LM seat was more suitable for fighter pilots. In addition, the crews did not have enough special helmets, which the pilots passed on to each other. The helmet size often did not match the required one, and this created some inconvenience. There were also no rescue suits required when flying over the sea. There were also complaints about the ergonomics of the cabin. For example, initially the main and backup flight instruments were of different types, which made it difficult to control the aircraft. On the recommendation of the military, the instrument panels were modified. At the same time, some amenities appeared on the plane, such as a kitchenette for heating food and a toilet. An interesting fact was cited in the press that the Air Force did not accept the new strategic aircraft into operation for several months due to imperfections in the design of the on-board toilet!
It should be noted that the developers of the Tu-160 tried to make its maintenance as easy as possible. Access to engines and units of other important systems turned out to be convenient. For example, electrical panels were moved to the chassis niches, and hydraulic system units were moved to the walls of the cargo compartment. And yet the aircraft turned out to be labor-intensive to maintain; for every hour of flight, 64 man-hours of airfield work were required. Preparation for departure required more than one and a half dozen special vehicles (car units for nitriding fuel, car air conditioners that cooled the equipment, TZ-60 Uragan fuel tankers, a minibus for the crew equipped with a ventilation system for high-altitude suits, etc.). The maintenance staff lacked headphones, safety shoes and anti-vibration belts. The use of aggressive fluid in hydraulic systems also turned out to be hazardous to health. In the absence of special clothing, shoes, headsets and various other special devices, the technicians could not perform their work properly. In addition, the design of some components and assemblies of the bomber complicated their repair and maintenance. In the first months of operational operation, preparing the aircraft for flight took up to three days; later, due to the efforts of the technical staff and “operators” from the design bureau, the time to prepare the bomber for flight was significantly reduced.
In connection with the numerous problems of the Tu-160, it is interesting to cite an interesting quote published on July 23, 1989 in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. One of the military pilots who participated in the tests of the aircraft expressed the following opinion regarding the design flaws: “The machine delighted us, simply captivated us with its rich capabilities. And yet it feels that the Tupolev Design Bureau “no one is breathing down our backs.” Monopoly!”
However, despite the existing difficulties, during the eight months of operation of the “one hundred and sixties” in Priluki, the first squadron of the regiment was able to fully prepare for flights on the new aircraft. The pilots and technical staff mastered the machines, which periodically flew six-, ten- and 12-hour routes. On flights over the sea, bombers most often flew in pairs (primarily so that in the event of an emergency, the “partner” crew could request help). During flights over the sea, crews were only given life belts, because... Marine waterproof overalls VMSK were not provided to long-rangers.
Flight missions gradually became more complicated, it was necessary to fly beyond the North Pole, and the longest flight, made by the crew of Valery Gorgol (commander of the 184th Guards TBAP since 1989), lasted 12 hours 50 minutes. The plane approached the Canadian coast at 450 km. NATO fighters periodically took off to intercept new Soviet strategic bombers. The period of mastering the new missile carrier is recalled by Honored Military Pilot of Russia Alexander Medvedev, who accepted Russian citizenship after the collapse of the USSR and later received the position of senior inspector-pilot of the combat training department of the 37th VA of the Supreme High Command (the same one who was nicknamed in the 184th regiment "ace Medvedev" ):
“We began mastering the missile carriers about a year before their arrival in Priluki. We went to the aviation enterprises where the aircraft itself, engines, navigation, and radio equipment were produced, and there we studied the materiel and its work. With the receipt of the Tu-160, active flight and combat training began. The Cold War had not ended by that time, and we were given the task of mastering the missile carrier in a short time. Moreover, during trial operation, it was supposed to be carried out by factory pilots, but we had to, because in the first flights there were up to 100 failures in various systems missile carrier... As it was mastered, there were fewer and fewer of them, and over time we began to consider it ours.
What routes did you fly? From Priluki we headed towards Lake Onega, then to Novaya Zemlya, Graham Bell Island and further to the North Pole. They joked: the “cowboy” was studying the States; the targets of a potential enemy were just a stone’s throw away. However, over the pole they turned south - in the direction of Tiksi, especially since the terrain there resembled Northern Canada. Then under the wing - Chelyabinsk, Balkhash, the Caspian Sea. They returned to Priluki through the North Caucasus. There was also such a route: Priluki - Baikal - Priluki. I flew along this route with Vladimir Grebennikov. The missiles were launched at targets located at a training ground in Kazakhstan. They entered the target launch area and parted with the missiles. Later they hit training targets in other regions of the USSR."
On some flights, the Tu-160 was accompanied by Su-27P fighter-interceptors based at the airfields of Novaya Zemlya and near Murmansk. According to the reviews of many pilots who had previously flown Tu-16 and Tu-22MZ, the “one hundred and sixtieth” was the best aircraft they had mastered.
The development of the new air-based strategic strike complex proceeded very quickly, and this was greatly facilitated by the high automation of the on-board sighting and navigation system, which simplified the work of the navigator. His task was to accurately bring the aircraft into the firing area, control the missile systems and select the launch moment. Target designation was entered in advance by a special program, after launch the rocket was dropped down by a pneumatic pusher, then at a safe distance it opened the wing and tail, folded for compact placement when suspended in the cargo compartment, after which the engine was started and a further flight was carried out along the route to the target. At this time, the drum of the multi-position ejection device rotated and brought the next rocket into the starting position.
All practical launches of the X-55SM were accompanied by aircraft command and measurement points "976", created on the basis of the Il-76 transport and cargo aircraft specifically for monitoring and monitoring the testing process of various types of aircraft and aircraft weapons. The training targets were located at the training ground of the Air Force Research Institute in Kazakhstan. Firing was carried out from the "one hundred and sixtieth" more often than from the Tu-22MZ. One of the planes, which fired 14 missiles, was nicknamed the “cowboy” in the regiment.
Speaking about the strike capabilities of the Tu-160, it is worth recalling that for many years the developers failed to introduce the Kh-15S missile system and conventional bomber weapons. However, in recent years, these issues have also begun to be addressed. In March 2003, in an interview with the newspaper “Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye” (¦8, p. 3), the commander of the 37th VA, Lieutenant General I.I. Khvorov, stated: “... We currently have one aircraft under repair at plant, and one of the stages of its modernization is being carried out. One of the goals of these modifications is to “teach” the aircraft to bomb. I note that one Tu-160 can carry on board as many bombs as a squadron of Tu-22MZ. Moreover, the modernization of this aircraft will be deep. In the future, it is planned to master the use of high-precision guided bombs from Tu-160 aircraft." Regarding the possible modernization of missile weapons, the commander noted: “Today, the DA is equipped with a missile that represents a certain intermediate stage before the adoption of a long-range cruise missile. It has a fairly decent launch range, allowing the Tu-160 and Tu-95 to be used.. . this missile from its territory. Having a relatively low electronic signature, an ALCM (air-launched cruise missile - author's note) can easily overcome the air defense system of a potential enemy. Today, "the product has a launch range of up to 3,500 km. We believe that an air-launched cruise missile with a launch range of five thousand kilometers or more meets today’s requirements most fully.”
Continuing the story about the initial period of operation of the Tu-160, we note that by the end of 1987, the 184th Guards TBAP had already received a total of 10 vehicles, but it still included Tu-22MZ bombers and Tu-16P jammers. Gradually, the “troikas” and “sixteenths” were transferred to other units, and some of the Tu-16s were dismantled and destroyed, in accordance with the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe. By the time of the collapse of the USSR, two squadrons of the regiment had 21 aircraft, the third squadron had only training Tu-134UBL, which were used to train flight personnel and maintain the flight skills of the crews, preserving the service life of combat vehicles.
It should be noted that the developers of the aircraft, engine and various avionics systems “accompanied” their equipment from the very beginning of its operation. Representatives of the design bureau and serial plants were constantly in Priluki, who promptly eliminated various types of malfunctions and defects. At the same time, it was possible to develop recommendations for modernizing a number of components and assemblies and increasing their service life. Thus, the initial 250-hour resource of the NK-32 engine was gradually tripled. To increase the compressor stability margin, the number of engine feed flaps on the side walls of the air intakes was increased to six, simplifying their control, some honeycomb panels of the airframe with metal core were replaced with panels made of composite materials, the tail fairing of the antennas of the on-board defense complex was shortened by half, the long-range navigation radio system was improved, navigation the complex was equipped with an autonomous astrocorrector, the PrNK software was improved, and the latest series aircraft were equipped with periscopes for inspecting the tail hemisphere. An attempt was made to reduce the radar signature of the bomber by applying black radio-absorbing graphite film to the air intakes and air channels, covering the nose of the aircraft with a special organic-based paint, shielding some components of the power plant, and introducing mesh filters into the cockpit glazing to limit the spread of the electromagnetic field of the equipment. Gradually, previously produced vehicles were further developed.
The hard work of representatives of the aviation industry and the technical staff of the Air Force brought positive results. The reliability of combat aircraft increased significantly, and gradually the “one hundred and sixtieth” became a real combat vehicle. This could not help but be noticed by the intelligence services of NATO countries, which monitored the fate of the new Soviet strategic bomber from the very beginning of its testing. The magazine “Aviation and Time” cited an interesting fact that in the spring of 1988, not far from the airfield in Priluki, a container disguised as a stump was discovered with electronic equipment that listened to radio communications and recorded the operation of aircraft radio systems. Therefore, the aircraft had to be equipped with special covers made of metallized fabric , shielding the nose cone of the on-board radar on the ground while the technical crew was checking the high-frequency equipment on the ground.
The “restructuring” of the state, its domestic and foreign policies, begun by M.S. Gorbachev in the spring of 1985, made it possible to remove the veil of secrecy in the field of information about the Soviet armed forces and defense industries. Military delegations from not only friendly countries, but also NATO countries began to be invited to the USSR. Demonstrations of new weapons were carried out in front of Western experts both in the Soviet Union and at major exhibitions abroad.
The Tu-160 was first publicly shown to Western representatives on August 2, 1988, when US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci visited the Kubinka air base during his visit to the Soviet Union. Some new types of aircraft were exhibited especially for the show, including the “Blackjack” of the 184th Guards TBAP with tail number “12”, which aroused great interest. Two more vehicles were demonstrated in flight. The US Secretary of Defense was shown the weapons bays, cockpit and other elements of the bomber. Many television stations around the world broadcast reports from Kubinka, and images of the aircraft taken from the screen appeared in the Western press. At the same time, some tactical and technical characteristics of the aircraft were publicly announced for the first time, including the flight range without refueling, equal to 14,000 km.
During the demonstration of aircraft in Kubinka, another problem occurred - after receiving permission to take off, one engine on two bombers, which were planned to be demonstrated in front of the guests in the air, did not start. In order not to disrupt the display of the latest Soviet technology, the Air Force command gave permission for the aircraft to take off with three operating engines. Thanks to the skill of the crews commanded by V. Grebennikov and A. Medvedev, as well as the good flight qualities of the aircraft, the show was successfully completed.
American pilots noticed the absence of a smoke trail behind one of the four engines and asked the commander of Long-Range Aviation, Colonel General P.S. Deinekin, about the strange “asymmetry.” We should pay tribute to the resourcefulness of the former Air Force Commander-in-Chief, who, worried about the outcome of the flight, evasively explained to the guests that the aircraft’s engines can operate in different modes, not always indicating themselves with a plume. It is difficult to say whether the Americans realized what had happened and that the combat pilots, during an important demonstration, decided to take off with failed engines. In the USA this would be impossible, but this is not America... The second unpleasant incident during the same show happened to Carlucci himself, when he, trying to enter the Tu-160 cockpit, accidentally hit an unsuccessfully located electrical panel (after which is why the pilots called this element the “Carlucci shield”).
Later, the newest Soviet bomber repeatedly participated in demonstrations both to foreign delegations in Kubinka and to residents of the country at air festivals in Zhukovsky and Tushino.
On June 13, 1989, again in Kubinka, the Chairman of the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, was shown the Priluki Tu-160 with tail number “21”. Coming down the steep stairs from the plane, he noted: the aircraft equipment shown was world-class.
The first public display of the aircraft took place on August 20, 1989 during the celebration of Aviation Day, when the Tu-160 passed at low altitude over the Tushinsky airfield. Then, in August, one of the bombers belonging to the Department of Aviation Industry of the Russian Federation was demonstrated at Mos-Aeroshow-92. At the same air show, the first prototype of the aircraft ("70-01"), which was not painted and had a natural "metallic" color, was shown in the air (with takeoff and landing). Numerous correspondents and visitors to the exhibition could see and photograph the experimental Tu-160s, standing approximately 200 m from the exhibition parking lot on the territory of the flight test base of the ANPK named after. A.N. Tupolev.
In September 1994, journalists and a number of specialists had the opportunity to familiarize themselves in detail with the bomber in Poltava during events to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the shuttle raids on Germany. Another show in Ukraine took place in Pri Luki in February 1995. And in May of the same year, a grand parade dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War took place in Moscow. In the air part of the parade, the flagship, accompanied by MiG-29 fighters of the Swifts aerobatic team, flew a Tu-160 from Engels. The former commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, Army General P.S. Deinekin, who commanded the crew of the flagship that day, recalled:
“With the serial production of the strategic Tu-160, Russia once again confirmed its status as a great aviation power and the birthplace of heavy aircraft manufacturing. When in the First World War, aviators in the West bravely chirped in the sky on Voisins, Blériots, Nieuports and Farmans with one engine, the Russians conquered the front-line skies on four-engine ships with the heroic name “Ilya Muromets.” Reviving this tradition, this is exactly what we named the flagship of the air parade over Moscow on May 9, 1995. The letters along the fuselage of the Tu-160 were written in Cyrillic large (fortunately there was enough space)! On that anniversary day on Poklonnaya Hill, among the distinguished guests were not only heads, but also military attaches of forty foreign states. After the air column flew over, many of them said that the Russian Air Force professionally showed them the formation of the first massive air echelon. Of course! entering the guest stand was only seven seconds!But our crew on the Tu-160 took off from the Engels airbase on the Volga, and the remaining 79 - from fourteen other airfields. At the controls of the parade aircraft were two commanders-in-chief - the Air Force and Air Defense, commanders of the Ground Forces, Navy, front-line, long-range and military transport aviation. Eight colonel generals! This never happened at air parades even under Vasily Stalin!
They flew off and settled at their airfields without any comments. We managed to get to the reception in the Kremlin on time...
...And how they flew during combat readiness checks! The whole team, day and night, in any weather! All the pilots (both left and right) were only first class."
Another public demonstration of the Tu-160 was held on July 28, 1996 in St. Petersburg, at a parade dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the Russian fleet. The plane of Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Serebryakov, escorted by four MiG-29s from the Swifts group, passed at high speed at an altitude of about 50 m above the celebration site.
The first airborne encounter between a Tu-160 and Western aircraft took place in May 1991 over the Norwegian Sea. F-16A fighters of the 331st squadron of the Norwegian Air Force intercepted and for some time escorted a pair of Tupolev bombers.
The collapse of the USSR had a negative impact on the fate of one of the most powerful strike systems in the world. On August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian parliament transferred all military formations on the territory of the state under its control. On the same day, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was formed. There were 19 Tu-160 bombers left on the territory of the new independent state, which absolutely did not fit into the defensive doctrine of this country. In February 1992, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree on the completion of production of Tu-95MS bombers and on the possible suspension of the ongoing production of Tu-160, provided that the United States stopped building B-2 bombers. However, the Russian proposal did not meet with an adequate response. In addition, with the collapse of the USSR, Russia was virtually left without new strategic bombers. This forced it to continue the production of such expensive aircraft, which began to enter service with the 121st Guards Sevastopol Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment (TBAP) stationed in Engels, which was part of the 22nd Guards Donbass Red Banner Heavy Bomber Air Division (TBAD) of the 37th VA.
It should be noted here that even in the process of designing a new air-based strike system, the first production Tu-160s were planned to be transferred to Engels, and the air regiment in Priluki was considered as a reserve one, but life decreed otherwise. Previously, the 121st Guards TBAP (which replaced the disbanded 1096th Guards TBAP in 1995) was armed with Myasishchevsky ZMD bombers, and next to it was the 1230th air regiment of ZMS-2 tanker aircraft. In mid-February 1992, the first of those newly released at KAPO landed at the air base in Engels. S.P.Gorbunov bombers. In May of the same year there were already three of them in Engels. Many pilots and engineering staff of the 184th Guards TBAP began to be transferred from Priluki to the Saratov region, who refused to take the second (Ukrainian) military oath and expressed a desire to continue serving in the Russian army. As part of the 1096th Guards TBAP, the formation of a squadron of heavy missile carriers began and, at the same time, the re-equipment of the airfield began (all ground equipment, simulators and aircraft training facilities remained in Priluki, and now everything had to be re-equipped).
On July 29, 1992, Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Medvedev, who moved from Priluki to Engels, first took into the air the Tu-160, now not of the Soviet, but of the Russian Air Force. Russia demonstrated to the world that it remains a strong aviation power. And on October 22, the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. Zhikharev, launched an X-55SM cruise missile over the test site. The next day, the crew of Lieutenant Colonel A. Malyshev conducted the same shooting practice.
The fourth car arrived at Engels in early 1993. Initially, to strengthen the regiment, it was planned to transfer six experimental and production aircraft that participated in various types of tests and managed to partially exhaust their service life in test flights, but this did not happen.
Thus, despite all the difficulties, the 37th VA of the Russian Air Force managed to maintain at least some combat capability. Even in the most difficult year of 1992, Russian long-range fighters tried to maintain their class, flying 80-90 hours a year (twice as high as in front-line aviation!). As for the materiel, Russian Tu-160s took part in the Voskhod-93 exercises in May 1993, during which aviation actions were practiced if there was a need to quickly respond to a threat to the country's security. The long range of the bombers allowed them to strengthen one of the strategic directions and support a group of Su-24M and Su-27 aircraft that were being transferred to the Far East (the launch of cruise missiles only had to be simulated - there were no suitable training grounds for them in Transbaikalia). The actual launch of a modernized missile with an increased range took place during the exercises of strategic nuclear forces on June 21-22, 1994, which were inspected by President B.N. Yeltsin himself. In addition to the Tu-160 group, successful launches at the Kura test site in Kamchatka were carried out by the Topol ground-based missile system and the Northern Fleet's Typhoon-class missile submarine.
As for the aircraft remaining in the neighboring state, at first the collapse of the Soviet Union did not have a significant impact on the service of the 184th Guards TBAP. In the spring of 1992, military units in Ukraine began to take an oath of allegiance to the republic. On May 8, 1992, about 25% of the flight and up to 60% of the technical personnel of the Priluki regiment took a new oath. The 409th regiment of Il-78 tanker aircraft at the airbase in Uzin also came under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. The cars were marked with the national yellow-blue symbols of Ukraine, replacing the usual red stars.
The Ukrainian Air Force found itself in an equally difficult situation. First of all, the problems affected the maintenance of complex and expensive aircraft. The regiment had to abandon flights for combat use, because... Ukraine did not have testing grounds. The supervision of bombers by the ASTC has ceased. A.N. Tupolev and the manufacturer, which was obliged to provide warranty service for the aircraft for 10 years. Due to a lack of fuel, spare parts and qualified flight and technical personnel, most of the existing aircraft had to be abandoned. Motor oil had to be purchased in Azerbaijan, and wheels and engines in Russia. The gradual depletion of service life and the shortage of spare parts and assemblies forced the removal of what was required from aircraft of the same type. However, by the summer of 1994, this need also disappeared - in the 184th TBAP there were only a few pilots left who flew the Tu-160, and they were given such an opportunity only a few times a year. In May 1993, the regiment commander, Colonel Valery Gorgol, had to land a plane with the landing gear not fully extended. Sometimes, on holidays, one Tu-160 took off from the airfield in Priluki to participate in the parade. As a result, five Russian vehicles turned out to be more combat-ready compared to 19 Ukrainian ones.
The fate of the remaining Tu-160s in Priluki was repeatedly tried to be resolved at negotiations at various levels. After the collapse of the country, Russia almost immediately offered Ukraine to purchase Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers under certain conditions. In March 1993, V. Zakharchenko, who served as adviser to the military attaché of Ukraine in Russia, said: “The armed forces of Ukraine are not faced with tasks that require such aircraft.” This opinion was confirmed by General V. Antonets, commander of the Ukrainian Air Force at that time, declaring on February 15, 1995 in his speech to journalists in Priluki that “... the critical situation in the country’s economy makes it impossible to maintain the Tu-160 in proper condition, therefore Ukraine interested in selling bombers to Russia."
Since 1993, this issue has been raised more than 20 times, but everything depends on the amount of compensation. The Ukrainian side valued each of the existing aircraft at $75 million. Moscow repeatedly tried to bring down the price, but Kyiv stood its ground. The Russian proposal to exchange “carcasses” for tactical aircraft and spare parts for them also did not find support. Ukrainian bombers, each of which required more than one million dollars a year for full maintenance, meanwhile fell into disrepair. At the same time, pressure from the US State Department increased, demanding that Ukraine comply with the START-2 treaty, according to which the USSR had to get rid of strategic bombers by December 4, 2001.
In 1998, the elimination of the Ukrainian Tu-160s, which were so troubling to the US military, began. For this purpose, as part of the Nunn-Lugar program (collective threat reduction program), the Americans allocated eight million dollars. On November 16, 1998, in the presence of American senators Richard Lugar and Carl Levin, the first Ukrainian Tu-160 with tail number “24”, produced in 1989 and having 466 flight hours, was solemnly dissected. The equipment for cutting aircraft was supplied by the American company Raytheon.
The second to be destroyed was an aircraft with tail number “14”, which took part in the anniversary events held in Poltava at the end of September 1994, dedicated to the 50th anniversary of American “shuttle” flights during the Second World War. This Tu-160, released in 1991, did not fly even 100 hours! Its disposal was completed in November 1999.
And a month before this event, in October of the same year, encouraging news appeared in the Russian media that the two countries had finally reached an agreement on the transfer to Russia of eight Ukrainian Tu-160 bombers and three Tu-95MS in payment of debts for the delivery gas. At the end of October, V.V. Putin, who was then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, signed a Resolution, which approved an intergovernmental agreement between Moscow and Kiev on the transfer from Ukraine to the Russian Federation of not only the above-mentioned strategic missile carriers, but also more than 575 cruise missiles (including including Kh-55SM air-launched missiles), as well as equipment. On October 20, a group of specialists from the 37th VA of the Russian Air Force, led by Deputy Commander of Long-Range Aviation, Major General Pyotr Kazazaev, arrived in Priluki to receive 11 aircraft. It is interesting that for three days Ukrainian customs did not allow the planes to take off, demanding from the crews certain documents authorizing the “export” of the cars from the country. It took a special telegram from the State Customs Service of Ukraine so that two now Russian missile carriers could launch from airfields in Priluki and Uzin.
On November 6, 1999, a Tu-160 with tail number “10”, taking off in Priluki, landed at the Russian airbase in Engels. The plane was ferried by a Russian crew consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Serebryakov (commander), Major Alexey Kalinin, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Sazonov and Major Yuri Paltusov.
In Engels, the aircraft crews received a grand reception. After the cars with yellow-blue cockades on the wings and tridents on the keels were parked, Russian flags were raised above them. The commander of Long-Range Aviation at that time, Lieutenant General Mikhail Oparin, and the head of the Air Force combat training department, Arkady Barsukov, presented valuable gifts to the pilots who ferryed the planes. Thus began the transfer of strategic bombers by Ukraine to the Russian air regiment, which previously included only six production Tu-160s (of which, at that moment, actually five aircraft could be considered in service). By the end of January 2000, all aircraft to be transferred to Russia flew to Engels.
The Tu-160 with tail number "18" was the last to return to Russia. Before that, he had not taken to the air for about nine years. With great difficulty, engineers and technicians who arrived from Russia at the base in Priluki managed to “reanimate” the strategic missile carrier. All damaged and expired blocks and assemblies had to be delivered from Russia. Five of the eight aircraft were overtaken by the crew of Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Serebryakov, and three more were carried by the crew of Lieutenant Colonel Igor Skitsky. Along with the aircraft, Ukraine transferred cruise missiles, which were delivered to Russia by rail. The total cost of the aircraft received was estimated at approximately $285 million.
According to the former commander of the 37th VA M.M. Oparin, all the aircraft were in good technical condition. The remainder of the total resource of the engines of the flown strategic bombers reached 90% of the previously established one (i.e., only 10% of the resource was used), which made it possible to operate them for several more decades. Thus, after the “acquisition” of Ukrainian aircraft, the fleet of Russian Tu-160s increased to 15 combat vehicles, from which two full-fledged squadrons could be formed (which was done).
In the process of forming the Russian regiment of Tu-160 missile carriers, each of them was gradually assigned their own names, which were applied on both sides of the forward fuselage. Thus, aircraft appeared with the names “Ilya Muromets” (at first this name was carried by two aircraft with tail numbers “05” and “06”, then it was left only on the second), “Mikhail Gromov” (tail number “01”), “Vasily Reshetnikov" ("02"), "Ivan Yarygin" ("04"), "Alexander Golovanov" ("05"), "Alexander Molodchiy" ("07"), "Vasily Senko" ("11"), "Alexander Novikov" ("12"). To be fair, it should be said that names began to be assigned not only to the “one hundred and sixtieth”, but also to Tu-95MS aircraft, as well as to the military transport Il-76. Thus, Russian aviation began to continue some traditions that began in the late 20s and early 30s.
After the transfer of strategic bombers to Russia, the Ukrainian Air Force planned to retain only a few aircraft and destroy the rest. One of the remaining Tu-160s joined the museum exhibition in Poltava.
An interesting message about the possible use of Ukrainian Blackjacks for peaceful purposes was published on April 14, 1999 in the English magazine Janes Defense Weekly (vol. 31, issue 15). The author of the article, Craig Hoyle, reported that three Tu-160 bombers of the Ukrainian Air Force could become carrier aircraft for reusable satellites in the interests of one American company, because in March of the same year, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the possible sale of aircraft to the United States. Platforms International Corporation of Mojave, California, was willing to purchase the aircraft and parts for $20 million and transfer a 20% stake in its OrbNet division to the Russian Aerospace Consortium. An employee of the American press relations company told the journalist that if the deal goes through, OrbNet will be able to launch the first satellite from a Tu-160 in one to two years.
The deal, naturally, did not take place, because... Russia could not be interested in transferring its main strategic carrier to the Americans...
After receiving strategic aircraft from Ukraine, the Russian Air Force created conditions for the formation of a strike group of Tu-160 missile carriers. But even before the formation of a full-fledged regiment began, especially after the military operations of NATO forces against Yugoslavia, the 37th VA, by personal order of the country’s president, resumed intensive combat training, taking part in almost all recent strategic exercises. The war in the Balkans and the decisive role of aviation in it served as a clear catalyst for the Russian leadership to make a number of important decisions.
Thus, the next “command and staff training” took place in the spring of 1998. Two planes from Engels made an ultra-long flight to the North Pole. Another crew of the guard, Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Serebryakov, performed an accurate launch of a cruise missile.
Another big “training” took place in the summer of 1999. On the night of June 25-26, a pair of Tu-160s and a pair of Tu-95MS took off from the airbase in Engels and headed north. The "one hundred and sixties" were piloted by the crews of guard lieutenant colonels Igor Skitsky and Vladimir Popov. Having reached a certain point in the Arctic Ocean, the bombers turned southwest. Off the coast of Norway, their routes diverged. A pair of Tu-160s passed along the entire coast of this country and simulated the launch of cruise missiles. Then one of the crews flew to the area of one of the southern test sites in Russia and carried out a real launch of a cruise missile. During the Zapad-99 exercise, the missile carriers spent 12 hours in the air without landing or refueling.
Many media in the West immediately made a fuss about the fact that “...Russia is preparing a nuclear strike on the United States,” or that “Moscow has violated Icelandic airspace.” There was neither one nor the other. It’s just that the 37th VA of the Russian Air Force once again demonstrated its capabilities.
The next “demonstration of combat capability” with the participation of the Tu-160 was carried out in the period from April 18 to April 21, 2000, when the Air Force conducted the next “flight-tactical” (that’s what they were officially called) exercises of the 37th Air Force. As the Russian military stated in one of their interviews, “...we need to show force in time in order to subsequently avoid its use.” The main goal of the exercise was to “...test the combat capability of aircraft after a long break in operation and improve the practical skills of the exercise participants.” During this next “check”, strategic bombers, transferred by Ukraine and undergoing the process of “rehabilitation” in the Russian Air Force, have already taken to the air. Tu-160 and Tu-95MS aircraft successfully launched cruise missiles, and Tu-22MZ carried out bombing missions. They also worked out the issues of controlling crews from ground points, as well as guiding “strategists” to simulated targets using A-50 AWACS aircraft when breaking through the air defense system of a simulated enemy using electronic countermeasures. During the exercise, for the first time it was possible to practice the combat use of high-precision long-range air-launched cruise missiles in conventional equipment.
In mid-May 2003, many news agencies broadcast a sensational message: the crews of Russian strategic bombers are improving their skills over the Indian Ocean! What really happened?
Two Tu-160 strategic bombers and four Tu-95MS were lifted into the air from the Engels airbase and headed for the Indian Ocean. The bomb bays of the aircraft were fully loaded: the “ninety-fifths” carried six X-55MS missiles, the “one hundred and sixties” - 12 each. The crews were headed by Lieutenant Colonels Kuznetsov, Gorlov, Zemnukhov, Dmitriev, Deineko and Skitsky. Having reached exactly the designated area, the Tu-95MS launched two long-range, high-precision cruise missiles, hitting training targets. The Tu-160, having a high speed, went somewhat ahead and, according to Igor Korotchenko, a columnist for the newspaper “Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye” (¦17, 2003), simulated launches of cruise missiles at the Diego Garcia Atoll, where the American strategic aviation base is located and US Navy base. The planes were in the air for more than 12 hours and covered over 10 thousand kilometers. In addition, other Long-Range Aviation aircraft (two Tu-160, eight Tu-22MZ and four Tu-95MS) “operated” over the territory of the Russian Federation in the northern, southern and eastern directions, which also successfully launched cruise missiles and carried out bombing on Russian training grounds. In-flight refueling of “strategists” from three Il-78 tankers was also practiced. For the first time in the history of Long-Range Aviation, three videographers and two photographers were trained for flights on the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS, who produced video and photography during the entire long flight of the aircraft over the ocean.
Exercises in the Indian Ocean with the participation of Long-Range Aviation aircraft can be considered extraordinary. This was confirmed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergei Ivanov, saying that in this region the issues of interaction between the Navy and the Air Force represented by Long-Range Aviation were worked out for the first time. In Soviet times, such exercises were not carried out.
In connection with the above, I would like to give a final quote from an article by Igor Korotchenko, published in the same issue of NVO, which talks about the possible prospects of re-equipping the Tu-160 with new high-precision weapons: “Combat capabilities of the 37th VA VGK (Supreme High Command - author's note) will be improved as the existing fleet of strategic bombers is modernized and the high-precision air-launched cruise missiles Kh-101 (in conventional configuration) and Kh-102 (with a nuclear warhead) developed at the Raduga State Maritime Design Bureau, which have a range of launch up to 5 thousand km and made using “stele” technology.
Yes, perhaps, the Tu-160 is indeed becoming one of the main restraining “arguments” of Russian defense policy at the beginning of the 21st century.
The fact that the creators of the Tu-160 and B-1 aircraft agreed at one time on the aerodynamic and structural-technological layout of the machines, which included elements of an integral design and a variable-sweep wing, is not surprising. The similar scientific and industrial level of the USSR and the USA, as well as the similarity of tactical and technical requirements for new types of weapons inevitably leads to similar technical solutions. But if you look deeper into this issue, the bombers don’t have much in common.
The B-1A appeared earlier and made its first flight on December 23, 1974, after which work on it was suspended. The press has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the receipt by the Americans of information about work in the USSR on a similar strategic carrier to some extent pushed the US Department of Defense to continue financing the work, but under the B-1B program. Apparently there is a certain amount of truth in this. The B-1A aircraft was modernized, while the developers did a lot of work to reduce its radar signature, installed new, more economical engines, updated equipment and weapons. The take-off weight of the modernized B-1B, compared to the B-1A, has increased significantly. Despite the major modernization of the bomber, supporters of the program and the military still failed to prove the need for a number of expensive technological solutions, and therefore Congress reduced the level of funding for the program. This ultimately affected the amount of titanium alloys used in the design of the bomber, as a result of which it was necessary to abandon adjustable air intakes (the latter led to a limitation of the maximum speed to M = 1.25). The aircraft is armed with long- and short-range cruise missiles, as well as nuclear and conventional bombs. The first B-1B prototype took off on March 23, 1983, and the first production aircraft was flown on October 18, 1984. Production of the B-1B ended in 1988 with the production of 100 bombers.
The Tu-160 began to be created in the USSR under the conditions of a socialist economy, when financing issues were not of particular importance. As much money was spent on armament as was required, and even more, so the aircraft was put into mass production and put into service in the form in which it was conceived (i.e., as a multi-mode strategic bomber capable of striking targets at great distances from the base in a wide range of altitudes and speeds).
While mass production of a new strategic aviation system was just beginning in the USSR, serial production of the modernized B-1B and its transfer to combat units was already in full swing in the USA. Now these aircraft, along with modernized B-52s and a small number of ultra-modern B-2s, form the basis of US strategic air forces.
After the collapse of the USSR, the balance of strategic forces changed. Russia had to make great efforts to at least partially restore its strategic aviation. Currently, the 37th VA has only one regiment armed with Tu-160 aircraft, which in number make up 15% of the number of American B-1Bs.
As for the capabilities of bombers, they can only be compared purely theoretically.
Yes, of course, the Tu-160 is very similar in appearance to the B-1B in its aerodynamic design and a number of design solutions. Like the V-1B, it has an integral design, a variable-sweep wing and a power plant of four engines. The geometric dimensions and take-off weight of the Russian aircraft are much larger (see table of comparative characteristics), so its power plant is almost twice as powerful. The speeds of the bombers are also incomparable. On the B-1B aircraft, as mentioned earlier, they abandoned the use of adjustable air intakes, so a bomber at high altitude can only reach speeds corresponding to the number M = 1.2, which, from the point of view of combat use, cannot be considered optimal. In turn, the multi-mode adjustable air intakes of the Tu-160, combined with powerful engines and a fuselage with a relatively small midsection, allow it to reach speeds of up to 2,200 km/h.
The reduction in aerodynamic drag of the Tu-160 was facilitated, first of all, by the successful layout of the fuselage, the strong sharpening of the forward part of the fuselage and the large bevel of the cockpit windshield. For example, its height when parked is no greater than that of the average Tu-22MZ bomber, which has significantly smaller dimensions.
But not only good aerodynamics contributed to the achievement of high flight-tactical characteristics of the missile carrier. It was designed as a multi-mode aircraft, thanks to which it was possible to obtain a greater range both when flying at high altitude and supersonic speed, and at low altitude in terrain-following mode. To perform a combat mission, the Tu-160 crew can choose any of these modes or use them in combination.
Experts believe that in terms of offensive weapons, the Tu-160 has some advantage over the B-1 B. The main weapon of the Russian aircraft, the Kh-55SM cruise missiles, is already quite well mastered by the Air Force. In addition, he, like his American “colleague,” can be a carrier of nuclear bombs. The creators of the Tu-160 provided for the possibility of expanding the range of weapons, including the use of conventional bombs, for which the aircraft was equipped with a high-precision optical-electronic bomb sight. The feasibility of such a decision was confirmed by the experience of using B-1B aircraft in the wars with Iraq.
Unlike the B-1B, the placement of all types of ammunition on the Tu-160 is provided for on the internal sling in two cargo compartments (instead of one in the B-1B) with larger dimensions than the American bomber (however, this also affected the overall dimensions of the Russian aircraft ).
As for aircraft avionics, the American bomber most likely has some advantages. The press reported that Russian and Ukrainian pilots, having had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the B-1B, rated its instrumentation very highly. The level of comfort and convenience of the aircraft's workplaces turned out to be close, although the B-1B cabin is somewhat cramped, since the nose landing gear compartment is located below (on the Tu-160 it is moved somewhat back). It should also be taken into account that to date some restrictions on the use of a number of systems on the Russian aircraft have not been lifted.
From the point of view of the Russian military, as well as a number of leading aviation specialists, the combination of flight-tactical and technical characteristics of the Tu-160 provides it with some superiority over the B-1B.
In conditions of chronic underfunding of the Ministry of Defense and, in particular, the Russian Air Force, Russia for a long time did not have the opportunity to maintain the technical condition of the bombers in service at the required level, not to mention the flying skills of the pilots. However, in recent years the situation has improved significantly, and Tu-160 crews began to take part in almost all major exercises conducted with the participation of the Air Force. Not only long-range flights in day and night conditions were tested, but also various options for the practical use of on-board weapons. Cruise missiles were launched successfully, targets were hit at a great distance from the launch point and with great accuracy.
The opportunity to compare both aircraft presented itself on September 23-25, 1994 in Poltava, where the Tu-160 and B-1B “met” for the first time at the same airfield. The US Air Force delegation arrived at the invitation of the Ukrainian Air Force to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the start of shuttle flights of American bombers to targets in Germany, landing at Soviet airfields. Flight and technical crews of the aircraft could familiarize themselves with the aircraft and, to some extent, evaluate them.
At various times, the commanders-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, as well as the commanders of Long-Range Aviation (37th VA), had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the B-1B. Thus, the Russian press quoted the words of the former commander of the 37th VA of the Supreme High Command, and now the vice-president of JSC Tupolev, M.M. Oparin:
“I have great respect for the people who outlined the prospects for the development of Long-Range Aviation in the 80s and early 90s. The safety margin built into the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic aircraft allows us to safely call them aircraft of the 21st century. After all, The potential of missile carriers has not yet been fully exploited. These vehicles are not only comparable to the best Western models, but also surpass them in a number of parameters. I say this with confidence, since I know first-hand the strategic aviation of “friends and rivals.” On B- 52 I was able to fly “live”, and on the B-1 in a flight simulator, after which I simply fell in love with the Tu-95MS aircraft and especially the Tu-160.”
Yes, indeed, both aircraft turned out to be successful and in peacetime became worthy rivals to each other. But it’s better to be “friends” with them than to oppose them...
